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The changing of vessels in the West Coast Rock Lobster nearshore fishery is one of the 
important issues which need attention within the South African fisheries management, that is, 
by fisheries authorities and industry (fishing right holders). This is due to the increasing 
problems regarding frequent vessel changes in the South African fisheries and the 
consequences in terms of increased fishing capacity. The thesis seeks to find major causes of 
vessels changes and how often the right holders change their fishing vessels. It further seeks 
to relate the policies of other fishing nations to gain measures to curb the problem of fishing 
capacity through the vessel replacement. The data were collected from primary and secondary 
sources and analyzed by both qualitative and quantitative methods. Various theories of 
capacity management were used in the study to explain the findings. The findings of this 
study reveal that transformation in South African fisheries has progressed, and that the fishers 
have shown development of their enterprise. Fishing nations like Canada and Australia have 
been used as cases for how to curb the problems. Some of the principles under laying their 
replacement policies may also be employed in the South African setting. A new and more 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The replacement of fishing vessel may refer to different issues in the fishing fleet, which 
includes replacement of old vessels, buyback schemes, restructuring and renovation of the 
vessels. The development of vessel replacement policies will therefore differ from one 
country to another, depending on the specific problems the countries wish to address. 
Generally the replacement of fishing vessels has implications for the conservation of the fish 
stocks, as larger vessels have a greater capacity to catch fish. The purposes of vessel 
replacements in most countries is to conserve fish resources through the limitation of 
harvesting capacity, regulate competition between fleets and meeting national and 
international obligations
1
. The French replacement policy is based on maintaining the 
profitability from fishing activities by balancing fishing capacity, fish stocks and marketing 
possibilities (Merout, 1986). Vessel replacements rules can help to stabilize the fleets and 
ensure an appropriate number of enterprises have a chance of to take a reasonable share of the 
available resource. 
The replacement of fishing vessels in South Africa is mainly motivated by commercial 
reasons. The reasons which are most likely to be mentioned by right holders include vessels 
sinking, technical breakdown, and bad relations between chartering parties, sea safety and 
investment considerations. The South African fishing industry has been going through a 
process of transformation in recent years allocating fishing rights to historical disadvantaged 
persons (HDIs). Under the Marine Living Resource Act (MLRA) transformation is a main 
objective to achieve equity by restructuring the fishing industry, taking into account the 
reallocation of some rights, reducing the quotas granted to existing companies and awarding 
to new entities (Branch and Clark, 2006). According to Caddy and Cochrane (2001) an 
examination of the replacement strategy shows that new entrants commonly enter the fishery 
with new vessels, which act as added capacity and furthermore the fishing intensity of these 
vessels is difficult to control by indirect measures. South African fisheries authorities have 
                                                           
1
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imposed a boat license limitation programme for new entrants, in order not to bring excess 
capacity into the fisheries.  
Problem statement 
The change of fishing vessels during a season in South Africa has been a problem in most 
fishing sectors. Quota holders across the fisheries change vessel every now and again, and 
some change more than others. Regulators administer and record vessel changes. The west 
coast rock lobster sector has been identified as one of the fisheries which receive a lot of 
applications for the changing of vessels originally assigned with specific quota. South Africa 
has no policy guidelines for the replacement of fishing vessel, and there is a lack of detailed 
guidelines on vessel changes. The sector policies only state that replacement vessels should be 
suitable for the fishery in each sector. The problem is not only the issue of administration, 
which in itself is becoming a large burden, but it also relates to the catch capacity within the 
fisheries, and hence, to the biological economic and social goals set for the sector. 
 
Aims of the study 
The study aims at understanding the reasons why fishing right holders in the West Coast Rock 
Lobster (WCRL) fisheries change the vessels that they originally contracted for catching their 
quotas, and how often they change within a season. Understanding these issues may give a 
base for developing a more efficient vessel replacement policy in the South African fisheries. 
Such policies could also be informed by what other fishing nations are doing in this respect. 
Vessel replacement policies are important both in terms of sustainable fisheries management 
(obtaining biological goals) but also in terms of achieving economic and social goals, such as 
transformation, that is, to obtain greater equality in terms of ownership. 
 
Research questions 
The current study aims to find possible ways to develop a vessel replacement policy for the 
South African fishing sector. In achieving the objectives the study tries to answer the 
following research questions: 
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1. Why is there a need for a replacement policy? 
a) control issues, 
b) capacity issues  
c) ownership issues. 
2. How often do the right holders change fishing vessels? 
3. What are the reasons for changing of vessels?  
4. How can the South African fisheries sector develop a policy more efficient than the 
present one?  
5. What can South Africa learn from the other fishing nations with specific vessel 
replacement policies?  
 
Research methods 
This study relies on both primary and secondary data. The primary data consists of vessel 
change approvals by the Marine and Coastal Management (MCM) branch of Department of 
Environment Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) for the South African fishing. The secondary data 
comprise catch data for all right holders in a particular fishery for a particular season and 
vessels used for that season. The study has used both quantitative and qualitative data 
collection methods.  
 
Organization of the study 
The study has been structured into seven chapters. It begins with an introduction which is the 
first chapter, describing the replacement of fishing vessel in South Africa. It also addresses 
the problems underpinning vessel changes and the research questions. The aims of the study 
are mentioned in this chapter together with the possible methods to analyze the data. The 
second chapter deals with the background of the WCRL fishery, which is the case in this 
study. The third chapter focuses on the theoretical aspects of capacity management. In the 
fourth chapter the work focuses on the research methods of the study and chapter five focuses 
on analysis and findings of the study. In chapters six, the study deals with the fishing 
replacement guidelines in other fishing nations and in chapter seven focuses on the 
conclusions of the study. 
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South Africa has coastline of 3000 km long, which extends from Orange River in the west, on 
the border of Namibia to Ponta do Oura in the east, adjacent of Mozambique (MCM, 1997; 
FAO, 2005). It has as an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200 nm, containing a huge 
variety of fish species (Martin and Nielsen, undated).  
The South African fisheries contain four demersal fisheries which are a deep-sea hake trawl 
fishery, a long-line hake fishery, a hand-line hake fishery and an inshore-trawl fishery. The 
demersal fishery is the most valuable fishery in commercial terms. It dominates South African 
fisheries and accounts approximately 45 % of all landings, and it is dominated by the deep-sea 
trawl hake fishery (FAO, 2005; Martin and Nielsen, undated). In this fishery there are two 
species which are harvested, deep-water hake Merluccius paradoxus and shallow-water hake 
Merluccius capensis. The demersal fishery was unregulated for a longtime, Total Allowable 
Catch (TAC) and Individual Quotas were introduced in 1978/79 respectively. The TAC has 
fluctuated between 140,000 tons and 133,000 tons from 1979 to 2004 (MCM, 2005). 
 According to Martin and Nielsen (undated) the second largest fishery is the pelagic purse 
seine fishery (anchovy and pilchard), and the pelagic sector is the largest in terms of volume 
landed (FAO, 2005). The landings of the pelagic fishery are approximately 500,000 tons 
including the red eye herring as the bycatch (BCLME, 2005). In terms of the value the pelagic 
fishery constitute 25 % to the total of the South African fisheries, and landings are processed 
for fish meal, fish oil and a certain percentage is canned for human consumption (Martin and 
Nielsen, undated). 
The rock lobster fishery is based on two species; west coast rock lobster (Jasus lalandii) and 
south coast rock lobster (Palinurus gilchristi) and is the third largest in South Africa. The 
west coast rock lobster will be described more in detail in this chapter. The south coast rock 
lobster is the deep-water species caught by means of long-line of traps operated by freezer 
vessels. The commercial fishery for this deep-sea species has been in existence since 1974. 
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The TAC of 450 tons tail mass was set annually from 1984 and later increased to 475 tons 
(FAO, 2005). The landings of the south coast rock lobster are generally frozen at sea and 
repacked at shore based facilities, and the entire landing is almost exported with a 
approximate value of R 100 million per annum predominantly to United States of America
2
. 
The South African line fishery is said to be a complex sector involving many species, having 
major components which are commercial, semi-commercial and recreational fishery (FAO, 
2001). The value of the fishery accounts for approximately 12 % of the South African fishing 
sector. It is a multispecies sector comprising of the following fisheries; tuna fishery targeting 
albacore tuna and yellow-fin tuna with catches ranging from 4,000- 6,000 tons per annum 
(FAO, 2005; Martin and Nielsen undated), a squid jigging fishery targeting chokka squid is 
regarded as the primary economic engine in the south coast, with a value R 40-R 90 million 
per year. The highest catch ever recorded in this fishery is approximately 12,000 tons in the 
season 2003/2004. Squid are frozen at sea and exported as whole to Europe
3
. The third sector 
in line fishery is the traditional line fishery targeting almost 200 species of marine fishes, of 




The commercial abalone fishery began in 1949 reaching up to 2,800 tons in 1965, when the 
fishery began to decline and quota control was imposed. The first commercial landings in 
1970 were in production quota of 227 tons (Cockcroft et al. undated). The abalone fishery 
stocks have collapsed in the past years; in 2000 the TAC was set 693 tons and by the season 
of 2005/2006 the TAC had collapsed to less than 240 tons. The collapse is due to the 
unprecedented levels of illegal and unreported fishing since the 1990s
5
. The abalone is 
currently under severe pressure from a variety of sources which has resulted in collapse of the 
commercial sector and closure of recreational fishery in 2003. 
The South African fisheries legislations were initiated almost eight decades ago with the Sea 
Fisheries Act of 1940 and the act was succeeded by new Acts in 1973 and in 1988. After the 
                                                           
2
 See http://www.feike.co.za/southCoastRockLobster.html: Accessed 12 January 2010. 
3
 See http://www.feike.co.za/squid.html: Accessed 12 January 2010.  
4
 See http://www.feike.co.za/traditionalLineFish.html: Accessed 12 January 2010. 
5
 See http://www.feike.co.za/abalone.html: Accessed 12 January 2010 
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establishment of the Fisheries Act in 1988, the Quota Board was provisioned for its 
establishment in the same year and became operative in 1990 (MCM, 1997). The Quota 
Board initiated attempts to bring in new right holders in the fishing industry in the 1990s. The 
Quota Board had been established to recommend guidelines for the reallocation of fishing 
rights, but the board did not do any major allocation prior to the 1994 elections (Nielsen and 
Hara, 2006). South Africa had a lot of programs since 1994 after the elections when the 
African National Congress (ANC) came to power, the programs aimed at empowering groups 
and individuals that had been affected negatively by the apartheid (Ponte and van Sittert, 
2007). A committee to discuss new fisheries policy was formed 1994, and the purpose of the 
Fisheries Policy Development Committee (FDCP) was to find ways to redistribute the access 
rights, but within the committee experts were chosen to review the access rights options. The 
access rights options were written with slight editing in the white paper after being submitted 
by the Access Right Panel of specialists (Hersoug and Isaacs, 2001). This white paper has led 
to the Marine Living Resource Act where DEAT had hired specialist to review the Sea 
Fisheries Act of 1988. 
 
The West Coast Rock Lobster fishery  
The early regulations of the fishery 
The west coast rock lobster (WCRL), Jasus lalandii occurs at 23 ̊ S north of Walvis Bay in 
Namibia to 28 ̊ S East London (Brouwer, 2005; Cockcroft and Payne, 1999). The WCRL 
occurs about 200 m depth in cool temperate water, with temperature ranging from 10 ̊ C  to 19 ̊ 
C, together with the closely related species of the genus Jasus that are found in southern 
hemisphere. The distribution of WCRL to far north off the Namibian coast is enabled by the 
Benguela upwelling system. According to Mayfield and Branch (2000) the WCRL has been 
slowly migrating stretching from about 150 km east of Cape Hangklip on the south west coast 
of South Africa to the east, and the lobsters have been migrating due to the unknown scientific 
phenomena
6
. The WCRL fishery is made up of two distinct sectors, the commercial and the 
                                                           
6
 The migration is governed by their biology and an environmental change, the movements of the west coast rock 
lobsters is not clearly understood. There are some possible causes for the movement, lack of oxygen which has 
influenced slow somatic growth. 
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limited commercial sectors and the recreational fishery. Approximately 80 % of the WCRL 
resource is located offshore, and 80 % of the TAC is allocated to the offshore fishery while 20 
% is allocated to the inshore fleet. 
The South African West Coast Rock Lobster has a long history of exploitation and 
Archeologists have found it as the component of the diet in early inhabitants on the West 
Coast (Melville- Smith and van Sittert, 2005). Commercial exploitation began in the late 
nineteenth century and expanded during the early twentieth century, and due to overfishing a 
minimum size limit was introduced in 1933 with a carapace length of 89mm CL (Cockcroft 
and Payne, 1999).  
According to Marine and Coastal Management (2005), the WCRL fishery was unregulated up 
until 1946, when a tail mass quota was imposed to control the fishery. This tail mass quota 
formed a basis of the output control management system and is still employed currently in the 
WCRL fishery. In the northern areas there was severe decline of catches according to 
available data and then the minimum 89 mm CL was reduced to 76mm CL from 1959 to 1963 
and then onwards raised again to 85 mm CL size limit in 1970 a measure that was applied 
everywhere, but in 1985 it was decreased again to 75 mm CL (Cockcroft and Payne, 1999; 











Figure 2.1: West Coast rock lobster TAC and landed catch (tons whole mass) for the period 
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According to Johnston and Butterworth (2005), between 1950 and 1970 the catches declined 
in the fishery, and then in 1979 the tail mass quota was replaced by a whole lobster quota. The 
whole lobster quota was managed by means of zonal TACs which were introduced in the 
1980s (MCM, 2005; Johnston and Butterworth, 2005; Cockcroft and Payne, 1999). The zonal 
TACs were made for four fishing zones each divided in two fishing areas. 
The catches increased in the 1980s, and according to Cockcroft and Payne (1999) the 
management was successful between 1980 and 1989, when the fishery produced stable 
catches. The catches decreased in 1989, and it was the rate of somatic growth which resulted 
in decreased recruitment (Johnston and Butterworth, 2005). In the 1991/92 season there was a 
temporary reduction in minimum size limit from 89 mm to 75 mm CL due to the slow growth 
which again resulted in poor catch rates (Johnston and Butterworth, 2005; Cockcroft and 
Payne, 1999). In the season 1992-1993 the initial minimum length was 80 mm CL, but it was 
reduced again to 75 mm CL, mainly for economic reasons. The other management measures 
enforced earlier included prohibition on the possession of berried females or soft-shelled 
lobsters, and a closed winter season and a daily bag limit for recreational fishermen (Sauer et 
al., 2003). 
 
The current regulations of the fishery 
West Rock lobster (Offshore) full commercial fishery 
Before the introduction of the lobster traps in 1960s the commercial fishery used handhauled 
hoopnets, which are light and easy to deploy from small boats in shallow waters (Sauer et al., 
2003). Initially the fishery was based on the use of handhauled baited hoopnets but 
increasingly traps came into use in the 1970s. Traps accounted 75 % of total catch during the 
season of 1996/97 (Cockcroft and Payne, 1999). The traps are made up of rectangular steel 
frame covered by polyethylene netting, and have a top or side entrance (Sauer et al., 2003). 
These baited rectangular traps are deployed at depths of down to 100 m and are left overnight. 
The gear have selectivity device in order to minimize the catch of undersize lobsters. The 
traps can be modified to target specific size ranges through design and bait, while escape 
vents have been have introduced in traps in various sizes and shapes (Groeneveld et al., 
2005). According to Brouwer et al. (2006), the current management approach relies on traps 
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with large mesh size, a small size limit and deck grid sorters for limiting injuries of small 
sized catches. In the southern fishing zones about 90 % or more of the landings are produced 
from fishing with traps (Sauer et al., 2003).  
Management measures currently being used in the both limited commercial and full 
commercial fisheries 
The resource is managed using the following criteria:  
• Minimum size limit  
• Gear restrictions  
• Total Allowable Catch (TAC)  
• Closed seasons and restriction on the retention of berried females and soft shelled 
animals  
• Sub-division into management zones and Marine Protected Areas (MPAs)  
Presently the minimum size limit for commercial fishers is 75 mm carapace length (CL) and 
for recreational fishers it is 80 mm carapace length (CL). The closed seasons vary regionally 
for designated zones around the coast.  
 The offshore vessel accepted vessel should be: 
• Maximum SAMSA certified length of 30 meters and a minimum length of 8 meters. 
• Equipped with functioning Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) 
• Geared to fish WCRL using traps and hoopnets only 
• Should not operate in another fishery 
 
West Coast Rock Lobster (Nearshore) limited commercial fishery 
The subsistence fishery has been replaced by the nearshore commercial sector in 2001, due to 
the high value of WCRL after reviews had recommended this fishery to be commercialized 
along with the traditional linefish (MCM, 2005). The transformation of the subsistence sectors 
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into small scale operations had been proposed in order to reduce the conflict while 
maximizing the economic benefits to participants. 
The gear used is only hoopnets and the right holders may not move between the fishing areas. 
The hoopnets are used to depths of about 30 m, and the hoopnet dinghies can operate in the 
inshore areas by means of outboard motor or can be transported to the fishing area by a 
mother vessel which is motorize (MCM, 2005). The fishers historically were more or less 
restricted to fishing near homeport because of their equipment, but changed to more mobile 
gear when they became capable of catching around the coast in different locations (Sauer et 
al., 2003). The nearshore accepted vessels should be:  
• Maximum SAMSA certified length of 8 meters7. 
• Geared to fish WCRL using hoopnets only. 
 
The recreational fishery 
There are approximately 48,000 recreational permit holders and the recreational catch is 
usually around 300 tons per annum (MCM, 2006). During the 1980s when the stocks of the 
resource stabilized after the decline since 1960s, during that period permit requirements for 
recreational rock lobster fishing were introduced. During the 1992/93 season rock lobster and 
abalone recreational permits sales increased by 33 % because of the increased recreational 
length season, and dramatic decrease for both species in 1997/98 due to the delay placed in 
sales, about one third of recreational permit sales elapsed.  
Recreational fishers caught lobster by means of diving without artificial diving apparatus or 
by ringnets from either the shore or the vessel (Brouwer, 2005). In 2002 the minister 
announced a fishing season for the west rock lobster starting from 15 November to 31 
December, and the fishing is allowed every day of the week but from 1 January to 1 February 
fishing is restricted to Saturdays and Sundays. Other measures in the recreational fishery:  
• Recreational permit-holders collecting west coast rock lobster may do so only between 
08:00 – 16:00. 
                                                           
7
 The SAMSA has been in place since 1998, under the SAMSA Act of 1998. 
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• Bag limit: Four (4) lobsters per permit holder per day for own use. 
• Minimum size: 80 mm - measured in a straight line along the middle dorsal line of the 
carapace, from the centre of the posterior edge of the carapace to the tip of the middle 
anterior spine. 
• West coast rock lobster in berry or with soft shell may not be caught. 
• Rock lobster for own use may only be caught by: 
o using a ring- or scoop-net from a boat not licensed to catch rock lobster 
commercially; 
o using a ring- or scoop-net from the sea-shore; 
o Diving from the sea-shore without the use of artificial breathing apparatus, 
other than a snorkel. 
• Closed areas 
Closed season is a helpful tool for management especially for reproductive outputs of 
individuals which are negatively affected by the harvesting, which often species of Jasus 
lalandii harvested undersized and breeding females (Arendse et al., 2007). The closed season 
occurs between 1 June and 15 November, and this method reduces the effort and allows 
reproduction (Branch and Clarke, 2006). The St. Helena Bay area is a MPA, and west coast 
rock lobster exploitation in that area is prohibited (Brouwer, 2005). Gear restrictions in lobster 
catches and new traps with escape vents greatly reduce undersized lobster catches in 
commercial fishing operations (Cockcroft and Payne, 1999).  
 
Commercial fishing zones/ areas 
The South African West Coast rock lobster fishing grounds are divided into six fishing zones 
(Zones A to F), Zone A to Zone C each consisting of two fishing areas (Area 1 to 6), and 
Zone  D divided to four areas (Area 7 to 10). There are also geographically separated small 
fishing areas which have been formed to Zone E (Area 11) and Zone F (Area 12, 13 and 14). 
The WCRL fishing zones serve as a measure of area restrictions, subdivisions and land based 
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sites. The fishing zones are divided proportionally among right holders in the form zonal 
allocations.  
 
Figure 2.2: Map of the South African coast showing the fishing zones and areas of the West 
Coast rock lobster fishery: Source Cockcroft et al, 2008. 
 
Historically, lobster fishers were more or less restricted to fishing near their homeport as a 
result of their rudimentary equipment. Through the development of the fishery people having 
more powerful boats (technological creep increase), with the changes to more mobile craft, 
fishers became capable of catching lobster at various locations around the coast. Today it is 
common for some fishers domiciled in one area to land lobsters in several other ports. This 
segment can also be sub-divided into different categories, according to the size and or type of 
vessel from which fishing operations are conducted (Sauer et al., 2003). 
 
Operational management procedures 
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The biomass of the resource have declined dramatically in the past years, and it was 
considered crucial was to develop a strategy for the rebuilding of the stock, Operational 
Management  Procedures (OMP) were developed with the aim of providing a basis for the 
setting of TACs. The OMP has been put in place in 1997, in order to adjust the TAC up or 
down, depending on the projections of stock (Cockcroft and Payne, 1999). The OMP for the 
WCRL was used targeting a recovery level of 20 % by the 2006. In the WCRL, annual data 
from the Catch Per Unit Effort (CPUE), fisheries independent measures of relative abundance 
and growth rates of the males are combined into a mathematical expression to calculate the a 
recommended TAC (Branch and Clark, 2006). The problem with OMP for TAC 
recommendation is the uncertainties in future trends particularly in somatic growth and 
recruitment (Johnston and Butterworth, 2005). The OMP represents a robust method to 
maintain a reasonable chance of achieving rebuilding targets and ensure smooth fluctuations 
in TAC. 
 
Current state of the fishery 
According to the resource status of the WCRL in 2006, WCRL rock lobster was recovering 
from severely depletion which is attributed by the historic overfishing and decrease in somatic 
growth, the recovery is associated with the effective management using of Operational 
Management Procedures (OMP). The spawning stock biomass by then was at approximately 
23 % of the pristine value with an exploitable biomass of 7 %. The current status of the 
marine resource for 2007 and 2008 states that WCRL is severely depleted with exploitable 
biomass of 3 % and 2,6 % and the spawning biomass of 9 % and 8 % respectively (MCM, 












Figure 2.3: Projection under OMP-2007: The trend in male biomass above 75mm carapace 
length (B75+), showing the median with 5% and 95%-iles. In each plot, the vertical hashed 





As the global fisheries consumption continues to grow, Illegal Unreported and Unregulated 
fishing (IUU) is the most fundamental and immediate threat to fisheries sustainability in 
South Africa (Feike, 2006). However it is difficult to assess extents, frequency and the 
impacts of the illegal activities, ten specific illegal activities threatening marine biodiversity 
have been identified in the South African coast (NSBA, 2004). 
Table 2.1: Illegal fishing in South Africa, species targeted are generally the same as gear 
concerned. Source: NSBA 2004. 
Fishery  Target species  
1 Illegal demersal longlining - hake and kingklip   
2 Illegal toothfish fishing   
3 Illegal pelagic longlining   
4 Illegal linefishing   
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5 Illegal FADS (fish aggregating devices)  These structures are used primarily by 
recreational skiboat anglers to attract species 
such as dorado and cobia.  
6 Illegal – west coast and deep sea rock lobsters   
7 Illegal abalone poaching   
8 Illegal east coast rock lobster poaching   
9 Illegal intertidal shellfish / rockstripping   
10 Illegal gill and seine-netting  A large amount of illegal gillnetting for galjoen 
occurs along the Cape west coast. Much illegal 
gillnetting occurs in St Lucia and Kosi Bay, 
targeting fish species such as spotted grunter. 
Illegal seine-netting in St Lucia targets 
swimming prawns.  
 
Organized operations for illegal tooth-fish operations have been a challenge for both 
nationally and internationally (Hauck and Kroese, 2006) and together with pelagic long-line 
illegal fishing have posed a serious threat to marine biodiversity (NSBA, 2004). The shift in 
compliance in South African has been mostly influenced by the highly organized syndicate of 
rock lobster and abalone poaching which is discussed by Hauck and Kroese (2006).  
“The highest profile case of illegal fishing in South Africa was exposed in May 2001 
when MCM received an anonymous tip-off about the illegal harvesting of rock lobster 
and other fish. This led to the seizure of a shipping container, owned by a commercial 
quota holder, Hout Bay Fishing (Director: Arnold Bengis), exported to the USA.  
Although the import declarations appeared in order, they differed from export permit 
issued by the South African authorities. A subsequent investigation identified 
approximately 20 other such shipments”.  
It is said that the consequences of overharvesting in the rock lobster is felt more by the south 
coast rock lobster (Palinurus gilchristi) fishery where after 1990 the catch per unit effort 
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started to decrease about 50 % up to 1998, and after casting the Hout Bay fishing company 
out of the fishery in 2000 the CPUE increased by approximate 9% per annum over the next 
five years. Hout Bay fishing has been associated with the declines in the CPUE linked with 
possibility of under reporting their catch for many years, although it was not certain that this 
company is the only one operating illegally (Hauck and Kroese, 2006). Illegal fishing has 
been happening in South Africa since the early 1900s where informal access to the resource 
increased, for the rock lobster between 1920 and 1927 restrictions were placed to form 
sanctuaries but informal rock lobster trade continued to thrive. The schoolboys increased in 
the harvesting of rock lobster because of high demand of the resource to supplement their 
pocket money by selling rock lobster, and gradually schoolboys became fulltime divers 
financed by fish shops and restaurants doing informal fishing (Melville-Smith and van Sittert, 
2005). The recreational fishers on the rock lobster have been taking more than their allocated 
bag limit of four a day selling their catch to the larger processing and exporting companies 
(Joubert, undated). 
Illegal fishing in South Africa has been caused by the historical disadvantaged individuals 
who were denied legal access to the resource, and this has been a tool of pressurizing the 
government to gain legal access to the resource (Hauck and Kroese, 2006). Giving formal 
access could result in decreasing the poaching by the HDIs, since the transformation was too 
slow and the poaching was booming in the abalone sector (Sauer et al., 2003). According to 
van Sittert (2001), poaching in the rock lobster was fuelled by the alcohol abuse in the 
communities whereby the fishermen will trade with five bags of rock lobster to get a bottle of 
brandy but also by unemployment. In many communities after losing their jobs they go to 
poaching as the only source of income. Fish Aggregating Devices (FADS) and artificial reefs 
pose a pollution threat and may increase access to otherwise inaccessible resources (NSBA, 
2004). Hauck and Sweijd (1999) describe illegal fishing as a complex problem starting from 
the involvement of broad spectrum players, ranging from water’s edge to the highly organized 
syndicates, and the issue of understanding why people get involved in illegal fishing which 
constitutes answers such as need, greed and politics.  
Hauck and Kroese (2006) noted that the importance of non-compliance in fisheries was 
highlighted in 2001, through International Plan of Action (IPOA) to prevent IUU. South 
Africa has been involved with the Southern African Developing Countries (SADC) countries 
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for compliance strategies to reduce the cost of surveillance in the region, and South Africa 
participated in its first joint operation with Mozambique in 2004 (Hauck and Kroese, 2006).  
There are also new institutions structures established Special Investigations Unit, Joint 
Investigations, Environmental Court Joint Investigations which work with South African 
Police Services (SAPS) and the South African National Defense Force (SANDF). South 
Africa has an 83 m offshore environmental protection vessel and two 47 m environmental 
protection vessels for the inshore areas. The vessels are equipped for firefighting, search and 
rescue work and with limited towing capacity. The three vessels are deployed in Cape Town, 
but they are working along the entire South African coastline and monitor various resources. 
These vessels are capable of patrolling the SADC region and are playing a significant role in 
regional compliance. The 83 m protection vessel is “Lillian Ngoyi” and her sister vessels are 




The Marine Living Resource Act 
 
The Marine Living Resource Act (MLRA) of 1998 is the primary driving force for the 
transformation of South African fishing industry. The MLRA have set up some goals which 
include:  
“provision for the conservation of the marine ecosystem, long term sustainable 
utilization of marine living resource and orderly access to exploitation, utilization and 
protection of certain marine living resource and equitable manner to the benefits of all 
citizens of South Africa.” (Marine Living Resource Act 18 of 1998). 
Furthering the transformation of the fisheries, allocation of rights has been the primary 
mechanism giving out principles and objectives set out by MLRA, three principles emerged 
from the objectives, namely:  
Sustainability, ‘preserving marine biodiversity, protecting ecosystems as a whole and 
conserving resources for present and future generations’; 
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Optimum utilization achieving ‘economic growth and employment creation’; 
and Transformation, that is ‘a need to restructure the fishing industry to address historical 
imbalances to achieve equity’(Branch and Clarke, 2006). The MLRA had for the first time 
recognized subsistence fishers giving them legal rights to access marine resources, thus the 
pilot program for subsistence rights was initiated by six communities in the WCRL fishery 
along the west coast (Isaacs, 2006). Communities on the west coast are heavily dependent on 
the fishing industry for their economical survival, harvesting species like the WCRL, snoek 
and white mussel. Employment is extremely limited because of poor levels of education and 
lack of necessary skills (Isaacs, 2006). The fishery serves as source of income for the local 
communities on the west coast. 
Transformation in South Africa is one of the important objectives in the allocation of the long 
term rights, where there is equitable inclusion of historical disadvantaged individuals in all 
sectors of the fishing industry (BCLME, 2005). In the nearshore sector about  93 % of rights 
holders were granted to HDIs and 25 % of rights holders were female and in the offshore 
sector black controlled ownership accounted for 61.8 % of the TAC and the percentage of 
rights holders that are black controlled was 80.65 % (MCM, 2005). Since the implementation 
of the MLRA there have been some developments in the WCRL fishing sector, and new 
entrants to the fishery were allocated the TAC from 2 % to 9 % in 1999 with a further 
increase in the 2000 season to 47 %. The distribution of the TACs was reversed under MLRA 
after the minister was taken to court of law by established companies winning on a 
technicality (Isaacs, 2006). 
The Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) granted fishing quotas under 
the Sea fisheries Act, 12 of 1988 prior the MLRA in 1998. The nature of quotas under Sea 
Fisheries Act is similar to the rights granted by the MLRA, and they are not property rights 
(MCM, 2005). The transformation of the South African fishing industry is driven by socio-
economic imbalances, as the apartheid policy had segregated access to the exploit marine 
resources in South Africa (van Sittert et al., 2006).  
Access rights allocation has adopted a principle of different types of fisheries by renaming  
them as clusters A-D, where cluster A and B are full commercial and cluster C and D are 
limited commercial (Branch and Clark, 2006). The amount of tonnage located to the offshore 
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fishery is more than 1.5 tonnes while the limited commercial is less than 1.5 tonnes.  The 
Department in 2001 allocated 234 full commercial rights and 511 limited commercial rights to 
former subsistence fishers for the medium term rights. The long term rights allocation 
commenced in 2005 for a period of ten years (15 November 2005 to 31 December 2015), 
evaluating the fishery for performance indices including achievement of the agreed goals 
(MCM, 2005).  
According to Branch and Clarke (2006), transformation have taken three avenues; re-
allocation of some rights by reducing the amounts granted to existing companies and 
awarding them to new applicants the so called Historically Disadvantaged Individuals (HDIs), 
reorganization of the existing companies, reshaping the old industry to achieve equity, and the 
last avenue where MLRA recognized subsistence fishers in addition to commercial and 
recreational sectors.  
Since the African National Congress (ANC) contested for its first democratic elections 
successfully in 1994, there has been a promise for “better life for all” through the programme 
of the Reconciliation Development Program (RDP) (Isaacs et al., 2007). The democracy of 
1994, the introduction of MLRA in 1998 and a new allocation system in 2001 have led high 
levels of expectations and more equality and more equitable access to fishing rights, where 
marginalized fishing communities expected security of owning fishing rights and ability to 
operate their own small businesses as to alleviate poverty (Joubert et al., 2008; Isaacs et al., 
2007). Although the transformation in the fishing industry in South Africa was meant for the 
benefit of the country as whole, and in particular of the communities depending on the 
resource, it was impossible to accommodate all the potential new entrants to the industry. 
Many people were disappointed and rightly or wrongly accused government and others of 
mismanagement and corruption for not being allocated rights. This has led to major issues in 
the South African fishing industry, high levels of poaching of species such as abalone, and 
poverty in fishing communities seemed to worsen and the communities became split into 
camps of rights-holder/non rights-holder or poacher/non-poacher (Stewart et al., 2009). 
Established companies have used several factors to slow down transformation, and they had 
shown fear in the allocation of many right holders that would create chaos and economic 
instability (Isaacs et al., 2007). Transformation started the chaos because there were more 
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Before the transformation started there were approximately six large companies which were 
in hold of the quotas: Oceana, Sea harvest, Irvin and Johnson, Atlantic trawling, Food 
Corporation and Viking fishing (BCLME, 2005). The redistribution created major dilemma 
between new entrants and the then existing right holders, because the new entrants were 
lacking infrastructure such as vessels, processing facilities and marketing networks  (Isaacs et 
al., 2007). Large companies forced the HDIs to lease their paper quotas since they did not 
have the capacity to process and harvest their quotas. In most South African fisheries there are 
too many right holders, thus creating conflicts with the goal of sustainable fisheries. The 
policy recommends the new entrants to invest in fishing vessels in order to secure large quotas 
in the fishery, leading to too many fishing boats and excess fishing effort within a fishery for 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical aspects of capacity management  
 
The concept of “fishing capacity” 
The replacement of vessels in South Africa can be assessed using a theory of capacity 
management in fisheries. 
A wide variety of fishing gears and practices ranging from small-scale artisanal to advance 
mechanized systems are used to harvest fish. Catching capacity is produced by fishing effort 
and the combined efficiency of the fishing gear and the fishing vessel as well as crew skills 
(FAO, 2002). Through the development of fisheries newer and more efficient fishing systems 
have been introduced. Most widely used harvesting methods are trawls, seines, long-lines, 
gillnets, entangling nets and traps (Boopendranath, 2007). The development of fishing gear 
and practices include the mechanization of propulsion, gear and catch handling, the 
introduction of synthetic materials, development of acoustics fish detection and satellite based 
remote sensing techniques, advances in electronic navigation and positioning fixing 
equipment. They all contribute to greater efficiency in fishing operations.   
Fishing capacity is defined in many forms in literature, either by referring to fishing inputs or 
fishing output. Cunningham and Greboval (2001) use the general definition in defining the 
fishing capacity:  
“Fishing capacity is, for a given resource condition, the amount of fish (or fishing 
effort) that can be produced over a period of time (e.g. a year) by a vessel or a fleet if 
fully utilized. That is, if effort and catch were not constrained by restrictive 
management measures” 
Basically the definition by Cunningham and Greboval is the same as that of Johansen in 
describing capacity in a production system, which Johansen (1967) defines capacity as:  
“The maximum amount that can be produced per unit of time with existing plant and 
equipment, provided that the availability of variable factors of production is not 
restricted” (Johansen in Mu et al., 2007) 
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Kirkley and Squires (2003) relate the fishing capacity through their usage worldwide to the 
capital stock and specifically defines it as: 
 “Maximum available capital stock in a fishery that is fully utilized at the maximum 
technical efficiency in a given time period given resource and market conditions” 
The fishing capacity in most cases is defined through the basis of the background, for instance 
capacity may be defined by technologists, biologists, economists, social scientists and 
fisheries managers and all of these professions have different views on fishing capacity. The 
fishing technologists define fishing capacity in terms of physical measure of the fishing 
vessels as well as the operational or technical efficiency of a fishing vessel to attain a certain 
level of activity
10
. The physical measures refer to engine power, gear size, gross tonnage and 
other technological equipments, and the level activity could be fishing days, catch, or 
processed product. 
The biologists define fishing capacity in terms of fishing effort and the resultant rate of 
fishing mortality, i.e. fishing mortality as the proportion of the fish stock killed through 
fishing. The biologists measure the fishing effort and then relate it to the fishing mortality. In 
this case if in practice a desired target level such as maximum sustainable yield (MSY) has 
been exceeded then fishing mortality is too high and the fishers have produced too much 
fishing effort. In biologists perspective fishing capacity may not be the issue if imposed 
regulations are in accordance with the target level of fishing mortality (FAO, 2004). In 
general, the biologists view of fishing overcapacity as a level of capacity that, when fully 
utilized, it produces a level of fishing mortality that threaten to reduce the fish stock biomass 
below the maximum sustainable yield 
11
. 
The economists consider fishing capacity either in terms of inputs or in terms of outputs that 
could be produced if a boat was operating at maximum profits. In input terms, the economic 
definition of capacity can be considered as the minimum fleet and effort required producing a 
given total allowable catch or given output level (FAO, 2004). Operating at less than the full 
                                                           
10
See http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/14856/en: accessed 14 March 2010 
11
See http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/Y4849E/y4849e05.htm#bm05.3.1: Accessed 19 March 2010. 
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capacity implies that the boats are not achieving full capacity and profits could be attained by 
the increasing their output. 
Fisheries managers tend to express fishing capacity in terms of the gross tonnage of a fleet, 
total effort such as standard fishing days, or even the rate of vessel utilization
12
. Assuming 
that there are no restrictions in place on effort that the measures may indicate that too many 
boats may potentially produce too high catch. Overcapacity is assumed to exist if the fleet is 
larger than required (FAO, 2004). Fisheries managers generally consider capacity to relate to 
measures such as gross tonnage (FAO, 2008).  
A term often associated with capacity management and measures of capacity is capacity 
utilization. This is the ratio of the current level of outputs to the potential level of outputs, and 
ranges from zero to one. A capacity utilization score equal to one implies that the boat or fleet 
is operating at its full capacity level (Pascoe et al., 2002). Capacity utilization is the degree to 
which the vessel is fully utilized, from an input based perspective it could be related to the 
ratio of the number of days actually fished to number days the boat could potentially fish 
under normal working conditions (Metzner, 2005). Capacity utilization can provide 
information on effectiveness of a capacity management program over time. When the capacity 
utilization declines, it may indicate that the program does not limit the capacity growth but 
just its utilization (Mu et al., 2007).  According to Kjærsgaard (2010), low capacity utilization 
implies overcapacity in the long term.   
To effectively manage fishing capacity some measures are required, and the current level of 
excess capacity has to be determined in order to see whether capacity targets are being met. In 
economic terms capacity is defined as the maximum amount that can be produced per unit of 
time within the existing firm, provided there are no restrictions. In the case of fisheries, an 
equivalent measure of capacity would be the potential output if all factors of production were 
being fully utilized. If the potential output exceeded the current output, then the firm or 
industry would therefore have excess capacity (Pascoe et al., 2002). The excess capacity 
exists when an effort level or catch exceeds the actual catch or effort level in given period. It 
is a short term problem that arises for a number of reasons ranging from higher costs or lower 
costs of fuel that may lead to boats operating for fewer days than expected (Metzner, 2005). 
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 See http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/14856/en: accessed 14 March 2010  
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The excess capacity fall as underutilized capacity, it is a short run phenomenon and depends 
on the type of resource, the state of the resource and the environment in which fishers are 
operating (FAO, 2008). According to Kirkley and  Squires (2003) excess capacity creates a 
number of problems by generating intense pressure in continuing to harvesting above 
sustainable levels keeping the fleet working as much as possible. The reductions in fleet size 
become politically and socially more difficult because the vessels are more vulnerable in a 
period of changes in the resource base and regulations. In the long term the fishing capacity 
results in overcapacity. Overcapacity is the excessive level of capacity in the long term, and it 
is a long term problem in the fishery. Overcapitalization exists if the fleet size is greater than 
desired to harvest a particular yield (Metzner, 2005). The desired level of harvesting is driven 
by management objectives, and they may be economic, biological or social or some the 
combination of the three (FAO, 2008).  
Overcapacity is widely recognized as a major problem affecting fisheries, and its social and 
economic problems may lead to erosion of management control. An unexpected increase of 
fishing capacity in TAC regulated fisheries has been observed because of additional vessels 
entering the fishery in response to the responsibility of temporary rents. Overcapacity is 
perceived as a major impediment to achieve economically productive fisheries (Beddington et 
al., 2007). Overcapacity undermines achievement of long term sustainability of the resource. 
Basically overcapacity has effects on the stock and economic returns of the fleets (FAO, 
1999). The biological health of the fish stock is affected by excessive fishing effort, resulting 
in reduced stock size. i.e. below the target levels of MSY in the fishery (FAO, 2004; Mu et 
al., 2007). With a declining stock, fisherman are forced to race for their share in fisheries 
regulated by global quotas.  
In quota fisheries, once the stock declines there will be increased high grading and fishermen 
will discard the undersized catch in order to maximize their resource rent (Mu et al., 2007). 
The fishermen work harder to compensate for the depleted stocks using excessive capacity 
which may be sensitive to ecological areas and result in increased bycatch due to the 
excessive capacity (FAO, 2008).  Economists refer to overcapacity as an indication of 
resource rent dissipation, where for instance higher profits may create incentives for new 
entrants in the industry or increased capacity by those who already are established in the 
fishery. In both cases the result will be economic waste of the resource (Mu et al., 2007). The 
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increased incentives create congestion and crowding, and the catch rates begin to fall as the 
fishing grounds are repeatedly exploited. This reduces the revenues of the participants and 
increases the cost of harvesting. The overcapacity issue tends to go back to the biologists and 
economists, where the biologists have to consider the biological health of the stocks and the 
economists have to consider the revenue of the fleet. Pascoe (2007) argues that the 
fundamental cause of overcapacity is the lack of well defined property rights, and hence, that 
administrators have to address the underlying problem. Overcapacity is said to be difficult to 
manage. Administrators have to address the issue of existing pressure of the current capacity 
in use and also address social issues concerning employment. Reducing the number of boats 
in the current fleet would result in increased unemployment and often the fishers have no 
alternative source of income.   
 The International Plan of Action for fishing capacity has urged nations that “States should 
develop the means to monitor fishing capacity systematically and accurately and to regularly 
assess any imbalance with the available fishery resource and management objectives” (FAO, 
1999). Even if the regulations are in place reducing the capacity in terms fleet size or engine 
power, it is important for the States to monitor fishing capacity permanently because 
technology development can still increase the capacity of the fleet, particularly in fish finding 
equipment and in fishing gear (Yu and Yu, 2008). Fishermen can find any ways to substitute 
whatever they have been restricted to, hence increasing the capacity of the fleet.  
 
Causes of overcapacity 
The origin of overcapacity is fundamentally the open access nature of the fishery. The focus 
on conserving fish stocks has led management authorities to move their fisheries from a 
condition described as of free and open access to one that can be characterized as regulated 
open access
13
. Access conditions in the fishery are one of the reasons leading to the 
overcapitalization, provided that there are regulations implemented in the fishery then there 
will be no overcapacity unless the output level exceeds the sustainable levels of the 
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 Regulated open access is a management structure in which some elements of the fishery are constrained, for 
instance using total catch  under TAC systems or restriction in the use of boats or gear, but still fishers have free 
access to the fishery within the constraints.   
 
 




. The existence of the excessive levels has implications on the stock leading to 
economic problems, such as incentives to exceed imposed quotas, the race to fish and to 
increased capitalization. These generally create overcapacity (FAO, 2008). Another concept 
associated with causes of overcapacity are subsidies. Increases in fishing capacity have been a 
direct consequence of national policies aiming at developing particular fisheries. Subsidies in 
most nations were used to ensure the nations participation in shared and high seas fisheries, 
and can create absence of effective fisheries management to generate excessive levels of 
fishing and overcapacity (FAO, 2008).  There are some contributing factors in overcapacity 
that have influenced the profitability of fishing such as: 
• Growth of harvesting technology,  
• Expansion of fish markets which provides favorable market prices,  
• Globalization of the market for fish and fish product that are subject to international 
traded commodities and  
• Changing nature of the fishing industry which is becoming more competitive and 
capital intensive. 
The small-scale fisheries which are said to be community based fisheries are less capital 
intensive, and these fisheries have employment opportunities so they are more labour 
intensive. Such fisheries are less sensitive to the changes in operating costs because of the 
cheap labour that they can afford (FAO, 2002). The larger vessels employ fewer people, 
because they are less labour intensive and maximize profit while reducing capacity 
(Kjærsgaard, 2010). Fishery systems have a complex interaction between fish stocks and the 
factors such as labour and capital used in harvesting fish (Tai and Heaps, 1996). When 
considering the management of fishing capacity labour and capital also need to be considered 
in developing input-based management (FAO, 2004).  
  
Capacity assessment measures 
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 Sustainable levels of the resource may refer to biological target reference point (MSY), economic reference 
point (MEY) and administratively through target levels of the required capacity within the fishery. 
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Many countries have developed a range of capacity indicators, and most of them they are 
based on physical attributes of the fleet (FAO, 2004). In some countries capacity is measured 
in terms of vessel numbers only, while in others capacity involves a number of complex 
capacity measures that include different vessels characteristics (Pascoe, 2007).  These 
capacity measures indicators range from gross tonnage (measure of the vessel volume), 
engine power (kilowatts or horsepower) and the number of boats. Engineering measures such 
as vessel units based on combination of characteristics have been developed, for an example 
in UK and Poland where they use the combination of vessel length and engine power (Pascoe, 
2007; FAO, 2004). There are generally two types of capacity assessment measures, input 
based measures and output based measures. The input based measures of capacity assume that 
the level of output is related to the level of physical inputs employed in the fishery. The link is 
between input level and the output level is basis for fisheries management using input controls 
(FAO, 2004).      
 
Capacity management measures 
Since the recognition of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZs) as state property in 1977, nations 
were faced with increased national capacity to harvest their resources because of many vessels 
returning to home waters. The countries now had to face with increased capacity which 
needed to be regulated. Under fundamental state regimes various methods of managing the 
world’s fisheries were proposed and adopted (Mather, 2004). According to Cunningham and 
Greboval (2001) capacity management can be defined as the implementation of policies and 
technical measures aimed at ensuring a desired balance between fishing inputs and production 
from capture fisheries. At a national level capacity management is regarded as the country’s 
attempt to harmonize the harvesting potential of its fleet with the desired level of output from 
its fisheries (Yu and Yu, 2008). The management of fishing capacity is to making sure that 
the fishing capacity is used in such a way that fisheries remain sustainable and viable. 
Capacity management alternative purpose is to avoid overcapacity, if it already exists, to 
reduce and prevent the build-up of overcapacity (Metzner, 2005). Capacity management is 
generally integrated and undertaken within fisheries management policies by most nations. 
The manager’s focus on the size of the fishing fleet when dealing with capacity in a fishery, 
the problem is usually stated in terms of too many fishers trying to harvest too few fishes. The 
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solution is most often that a manager likely to implement to reduce the harvest, in order to 
allow the stock to recover and reduce the fleet to a point where it is commensurate with the 
long term potential yield from the fishery (FAO, 2008). The purpose of the capacity 
management is that to ensure the fisheries remain sustainable and viable using regulations, so 
capacity management is meant to avoid overcapitalization and overfishing (Metzner, 2005). 
Hence, capacity management addresses the issues concerning economists and biologists. 
Overcapacity basically indicates that capacity is greater than the desired level and the capacity 
management identifies the desired level of capacity and bring the existing capacity in line 
with the desired level, and the desired level of capacity is either input or output based and is in 
relation with the stock size and level of exploitation (FAO, 2004). The existence of excess 
capacity does not pose any threat provided that the total output of the fishery is constrained to 
a sustainable level from pure stock perspective (Pascoe et al., 2002). Overcapacity has 
biological as well as economic consequences, excess levels of fishing effort result in a decline 
of the size of stocks; yields are declining below maximum sustainable yields (MSY) due to 
the consequence of overcapacity, these impose implications for the success of the stock 
conservation measures.  From an economic point of view the consequences of overcapacity 
are overexploitation and inefficient use of the resources, the capital stock and all productive 
factors associated with the fishing activity (FAO, 2008).  
The FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries recognises that the overcapacity 
threatens the world’s fisheries and it recommends that  
“States should prevent overfishing and excess fishing capacity and should implement 
management measures to ensure that fishing effort is commensurate with the 
productive capacity of the fishery resources and their sustainable utilization. States 




The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries points out in article (7.2)
16
, that it  
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See http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.HTM#6. Accessed 14 March 2010 
16
 See http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.HTM#7. Accessed 14 March 2010 
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“recognizes that long-term sustainable use of fisheries resources is the overriding 
objective of conservation and management, States and sub regional or regional 
fisheries management organizations and arrangements should, inter alia, adopt 
appropriate measures, based on the best scientific evidence available, which are 
designed to maintain or restore stocks at levels capable of producing maximum 
sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors, 
including the special requirements of developing countries”.  
Management of fisheries is important in achieving societal goals through the implementation 
of appropriate policies and effective regulatory instruments (Charles, 2001). The decline in 
fishing income as results of overcapacity have an impact on the fishers as well as other sectors 
in the local economy particularly in small scale coastal communities which fishing sector 
serve as a source of income (FAO, 2008).    
Capacity management is classified in two broad groups in terms of incentives effects they are 
likely to produce on users. One is the incentive adjusting approach which provides economic 
incentives for fishers to control capacity of their own without direct government intervention. 
The other approach, in which the government use attempt to manage capacity, is the incentive 
blocking measure. Incentive blocking measure attempts to block the incentives of open 
access, which leads the fishers to race for fish and overextend their investment (Yu and Yu, 
2008). 
 
Incentive blocking measures 
Most fishing nations commonly use the incentive blocking measure in fisheries management. 
According to Metzner (2005) the incentive blocking approaches encourage the fishing 
participants to work and maximize their revenues via catch quantities at whatever cost instead 
of minimizing costs and maximize profits. Incentive blocking measures attempt to block the 
economic motive that encourages the fishers to increase their fishing capacity. The incentive 
blocking measures are also regarded as the command and control measures that restrict the 
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In practice several conditions make effective control of fishing effort difficult. The command 
and control measures do not remove the economic incentives that generate overcapacity 
(Jensen, 2002), for example; license limitations preventing new entrants from joining the 
fishery do not reduce the incentive for fishers to increase their individual catches (FAO, 
2004). Fishing capacity is not a one-dimensional concept (Jensen, 2002). The selected inputs 
may encourage the fishermen to avoid the regulation by increasing the unregulated inputs. 
The fishers may for example increase the engine power of their vessels to cover more 
grounds, and this input substitution results in higher operating costs than used to be. The end 
results with increased mixes of inputs by the fishermen is an inefficient fishing fleets with 
excessive fishing effort levels, overfished stocks and complex fisheries management (FAO, 
2004).  
Measures in this category include: 
 
Limited entry programs, license limitations programs 
The limited entry is a common management tool used by government by issuing a limited 
number of licenses to fish. The limited entry creates rights for fish and limits entry in new 
fishing boats or fishers with the aim of limiting potential capacity (FAO, 2002). Limited entry 
is the first step in addressing the open access problem although it is not sufficient by itself as a 
management measure. It requires other controls to manage capacity as capacity can increase 
in various forms such as capital stuffing, changes in gear and fishing periods (FAO, 2004). 
 
Buyback programs 
Buyback programmes buy and remove vessels, licenses or vessel capacity units from a fleet to 
decrease capacity. Buyback programs are explained more in detail below. 
  
Gear and vessel restrictions 
Gear and vessel restrictions attempt to control the use of inputs in the production of fishing 
effort. Some fishing vessel tends to use the size of the fishing gear that is appropriate to 
vessels size and horse power but newer developments in gear increase the effectiveness of the 
vessels (FAO, 2002). Minimum mesh size, restrictions on the number of pots or traps, limits 
on the length of the long-lines are methods employed in regulations of fishing gear. Fishers 
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generally try to avoid gear regulations by substituting with other factors that are not regulated 
in order to increase efficiency of the gears (FAO, 2004). 
   
Total allowable catches (TACs) 
Capacity management requires allocation of fishing rights between different user groups and 
also in international waters a division of stocks between nations. The aggregate quotas are 
used to maintain or rebuild the stock by establishment of total allowable catches (TACs). 
TACs are likely to speed up capacity rather than reducing it, as new entrants allocated TACs 
because of the resource rents causing expansion in fishing capacity (FAO, 2004).  
 
Individual effort quotas (IEQs) 
The individual effort quotas (IEQs) limit the fishing effort that a craft can apply to a fishery. 
The effort quotas may fall between the two categories incentive blocking and incentive 
adjusting measures, because they have the benefit of creating incentives for self adjustment. 
The restrictions are usually placed on the trawl time, time away from the port or fishing days 
that a vessel can employ. Sometime the IEQs are transferable, and fishers can purchase them 
from existing fishers or sell to new entrants (FAO, 2004).   
 
The incentive blocking programs are introduced to achieve short term goals, and are effective 
in slowing increases in capacity in the short term (FAO, 2008).  
 
Incentives adjusting measures 
 
The incentive adjusting approach is a long term solutions to correct overcapacity through the 
changing the regulatory system creating market forces that reduces overcapacity. They are 
designed to eliminate overcapacity by correcting the open access market externality in 
fisheries by establishing user rights (Metzner, 2005). The changing of regulatory environment 
creating market incentives causes the fishers to adjust their fishing capacity, as well as the 
elimination of the open access externality that causes the fishers to behave as if they own the 
resource (FAO, 2008). Fishers have the reason to invest in the future by conserving both the 
fishery resource and other resources used in its harvesting when the fishery resource is no 
longer free to anyone harvesting it. Incentive adjusting measures transform race to fish into a 
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principle of production where maximizing profit of limited resource at a minimum costs 
(Metzner, 2005).   
 
Measures in this category include: 
 
Fishing rights including community development quotas (CDQs), cooperative fishing rights, 
community–based management user rights 
 
Community based and co-management has been introduced in many countries and has 
success in reducing capacity. This type of restrictions brings management to the community, 
and involving the community in designs and acceptances of management measures.  The 
community based management also improves compliance in fisheries (Charles, 2001). 
 
Area or region based Territorial Use Rights (TURFs) 
TURFs are another means of controlling capacity causing the fishers to behave as if property 
rights for fishing ground exist. The particular fishing ground access is restricted to a group or 
a number of individuals where the group can determine the how to harvest the fish from the 
fish ground (FAO, 2004). 
 
Individual fishing quotas (IFQs) and individual transferable quotas 
Individual transferable quotas limit the fish that a fleet can harvest from a fishery and assign 
tradeable shares of total catch to the participants. ITQs have been regarded as effective in the 
capacity management in fisheries to which they have been employed but there are some 
critics regarding their applications in capacity management. There are concerns regarding the 
existence of high grading, when fish is paid according to size (FAO, 2004). The discarding of 
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Table 3.1: Management instruments: incentive blocking and incentive adjusting measures: 
source FAO (2004). 
 
Incentive blocking instruments  Incentive adjusting instruments 
 Limited entry Individual transferable quotas 
(ITQs) 
Buyback programmes Taxes and  royalties 
Gear and vessel restrictions Group fishing rights (CDQs, etc) 
Aggregate quotas Territorial use rights (TURFs) 
 Non-transferable vessel catch limits  
 Individual effort quotas (IEQs)  
 
Vessels decommissioning schemes 
Many countries operate buyback programs such as Japan, Norway, Australia, the United 
States, Canada and those in the European Union and also Taiwan. This capacity reduction tool 
is often called in different ways from vessel buybacks, vessel decommissioning and vessel 
scrapping programmes. The buyback programs are designed to buy and remove boats, 
licences or vessel capacity units from fleets, and hence decreasing capacity (FAO, 2008; 
FAO, 2004). Chinas coastal and inshore water has increased number of small boats operation 
since 1985, the substantial increase has been caused by several factors. The factors include 
fish products prices which are profitably, migration of farmers to the coastal communities and 
uncontrollable fishing boat constructions. In addressing the issue China has an eight year 
buyback a programme (2003-2010) under Ministry of Agriculture (MOA); the aim is to 
delisencing and scrapping a total of 3750 vessel per year (Mu et al., 2007). In Taiwan due to 
the inadequacy of policy regulations, the government adopted mandatory and voluntary vessel 
scrapping. Due to the increasing number of vessel the benefits for the coastal communities 
decreased, the government implemented its vessel buyback program for licenses and vessel in 
1991-1995. The voluntary buyback program was implemented in 2000 to meet the IPOA -
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China is the one of the countries facing a serious problem of overcapacity in its marine 
capture fisheries. The management of fishing capacity is the responsibility of both State and 
private organisations, sometimes it is only the State and in others it is the combination of the 
two. China is the example of State responsible for capacity management and in attempt to 
include private organisation. The Chinese government is responsible for the management of 
capacity. China has launched a series of actions to control fishing capacity or in the capacity 
utilization (Yu and Yu, 2008). According to Mu et al., (2007), China may phase into one of 
the principle of Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF), participation where the 
government and industry jointly funded structural adjustment program. 
The design of this programme is to remove physical capacity, but it also assumed that the 
reduction of harvesting capacity also occurs due to this program. The program also acts as a 
subsidy to the unviable firms in the industry to exit the industry and by helping the remaining 
vessels to become more economical efficient, providing economic assistance to the fishery or 
region (FAO, 2008; Jensen, 2002). 
Jensen (2002) argues that buyback program reduces the risk of investing in fishing vessel, and 
in a perfect capital market the decrease in risk is normally followed by reduction in interest 
rates and increase in the incentive to invest. The decommissioning scheme if used as the 
permanent instrument may have unintended effects on the incentives and yet the buybacks on 
itself would not remove economic incentives for creation of overcapacity. In actual practice 
achieving the goals of the scrapping programs seemed to be very limited, it is associated with 
the existence of other fishery regulations (FAO, 2004). In short term capacity may be reduced 
in fishery through buybacks and in long term fishery incentives remain, and improvements in 
stock abundance will attract additional capacity. Unless the decommissioning scheme are 
used in conjunction with access rights management system that correct market incentives 
(FAO, 2008).       
The target level of removal of the capacity using buyback program may face some 
consequences, fishers looking for higher price for their ageing vessel. In the Australian prawn 
fishery where the management authority has a fixed price, fishers had to accept or decline the 
price hence higher prices attract active vessels. The expectations of future higher prices offers 
create disincentives for fishers to participate in the program as they expect to sell with higher 
prices in the following year (Pascoe et al., 2002). Sometimes the decommissioning scheme 
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cause problems if there are limit controls in place, because fishers can reinvest in more 
efficient vessels after their buybacks.  In Spain it was observed that more efficient vessels 
were decommissioned but the skippers were re-entering the fishery using the money from 
buyback scheme for new and more efficient vessels (Pascoe et al., 2002). 
The responsibility for the management of fishing capacity 
The United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982) recognises that States have a 
responsibility for managing all living and non living natural resources within their Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) based on article 56 (1a). According to FAO (2008) the Environmental 
Agenda for the 21
st
 Century arising from the 1992 Green Summit held in Rio de Janeiro 
identified global fishing capacity as an international problem and included all governments to 
cooperate in addressing the crisis in global fisheries. Most States impose target restrictions on 
catches in key offshore fisheries while many inshore remain relatively unregulated. The issue 
of capacity management has been identified in the early 1990s, yet the FAO held technical 
workshops on measurement and management of fishing capacity, then the International Plan 
of Action for the Management of fishing capacity was adopted in 1999. The IPOA-capacity 
encouraged countries to manage fishing capacity in three phases, through assessment and 
diagnosis, adoption of management measures and periodic adjustment of such assessment and 
diagnostic measures (Huang and Chuang, 2010). These steps were urged to be progressively 
implemented by 2005 by both regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) and 
States. 
The objective of the plan of action is to strengthen national and regional organisation in 
managing the fishing capacity issues and reduce excessive fishing capacity in world fisheries 
(Yu and Yu, 2008). The nations should base their fishing capacity management on principles 
and approaches of Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, which include participation, 
phased implementation, holistic approach, conservation, priority, new technologies and 
mobility.  The cooperative management once in place it will make the industry itself be 
responsible for the capacity management.  It also said that effective participation of fishermen 
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Chapter 4: Research methodology   
 
Introduction  
Methodology is defined as the choice we make about cases to study, methods of data 
gathering, forms of data analysis etc, in planning and executing study (Silverman, 2005). The 
methods can be either qualitative techniques or quantitative techniques. The chapter 
elaborates qualitative and quantitative techniques used in the study.  
The study employed inductive strategy as an attempt to answer research questions. According 
to Blaikie (2000) inductive strategy starts with data collection, followed by data analysis, and 
then the development of generalizations. As the study tries find suitable managements 
regarding the changing of vessel within the west coast rock lobster sector. 
 
Data collection 
This is a process of gathering information or processing and preparing data, the data obtained 
can be used to obtain information either to keep record or to make important decision about 
the situation (i.e. draw conclusions out of the collected data)
17
. The data can be in the form of 
interviews, words, figures or documents etc. The data can be either primary or secondary.  
In this study the information was gathered using primary and secondary data sources. The 
sources of the primary data are the government documents on the vessel approvals for 
changing of vessels and the secondary data used extracted from the government data base 
MAST, internet, published journals and the fishery policy documents. As mentioned in the 
introduction of the thesis; the fieldwork conducted is based on both qualitative and 
quantitative methods for data collection. The content analysis of documents was the method 
used for gathering primary data and secondary data, to be used to enrich the study. 
 
                                                           
17
 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_collection: Accessed 15/04/2010 
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Qualitative methods  
Qualitative research methods are characterized by an emphasis in describing, understanding, 
and explaining complex phenomena, tracking unique or unexpected events, revealing 
experience and interpretation of events by actors with widely differing stakes and roles; 
giving voice to those whose views are rarely heard; conducting initial explorations to develop 
theories; and to generate and test hypotheses; and moving toward explanations. The focus is 
on understanding the full multi-dimensional, dynamic picture of the subject of study
18
.  
Qualitative methods are also effective in identifying intangible factors, such as social norms, 
socioeconomic status, gender roles, ethnicity, and religion, whose role in the research issue 
may not be readily apparent. The qualitative researcher is therefore concerned with the 
understanding rather than explanation; naturalistic observation rather than controlled 
measurements; and the subjective exploration of reality from the perspective of an insider. 
This can be achieved through unstructured interviews and meetings, assuming that during the 
process detailed and rich information would be generated. The distinction of the qualitative 
approach, data is presented in the form of words, pictures and quotes (Silverman, 2005). In 
this study the qualitative technique used in the analysis of documents.  
Quantitative methods 
The quantitative research methods are generally concerned with counting and measuring 
aspects of social life (Blaikie, 2000). The quantitative research refers to the systematic 
empirical investigation of quantitative properties and phenomena and their relationships. The 
objective of quantitative research is to develop and employ mathematical models, theories 
and/or hypotheses pertaining to phenomena.  
The process of measurement is central to quantitative research because it provides the 
fundamental connection between empirical observation and mathematical expression of 
quantitative relationships
19
. The sources of data were Marine and Coastal Management catch 
data on WCRL nearshore fishery. The data is from the 2006/2007, 2007/ 2008 and 2008/2009 
                                                           
18
 See http://www.colmr.research.va.gov/mgmt_research_in_va/methodology/qualitative_research.cfm#4: 
Accessed 25/02/2010 
19
 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantitative_research: Accessed 26/02/2010 
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fishing seasons. The quantitative approach in the study will serve to support the trend of right 
holders changing vessels in particular season under study. The trend in the vessels changes is 
the nature of the study to determine whether the rate of right holders changing vessels is 
increasing or decreasing.    
 
Data reduction and analysis  
According to Namely et al., (2007) analysis often falls into one of two categories, the content 
and thematic. In content analysis a researcher evaluates the frequency and saliency of 
particular phrases in the body of text in order to identify keywords. The thematic approach is 
more involved and nuanced. Thematic analysis identifies and describes both explicit and 
implicit ideas. 
Content analysis of documents 
This is a non-intrusive form of research. This involves reviewing documents, memos or other 
pieces of written information for content and themes. By examining written word, the 
researcher is studying one type of communication that occurs in the selected sample. The 
documents as data source can be used in conjunction with either quantitative or qualitative 
methods (Blaikie, 2000). During the fieldwork the qualitative data was collected on the 
government documents. With the help of the colleagues in the resource management I was 
able to locate the necessary documents. In this study, right holders within the west coast rock 
lobster nearshore fishery applications for vessel change and approvals were used to extract 
contents on documents. It took a lot of time for me to process the documents because these 
documents were mixed up, all applications for vessel changes in WCRL both offshore and 
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Limitations of the study 
There are some limitations on this study which should be taken into account. The study is 
based only on one fishing sector, the West Coast Rock Lobster nearshore. There are also other 
fishing sectors which experience vessel changes and which may not in the same manner as the 
west coast rock lobster nearshore, therefore maybe it will be impossible to state general 
conclusions about vessel replacement in fisheries of South Africa. Secondly so far the data is 
limited this may give some problems in the analysis of the study. Lastly the study has limited 
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Chapter 5: Analysis of vessel changes in the WCRL nearshore fishery 
 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the main reasons for the right holders to change their nominated vessel 
to replacement vessels and attempts to answer the research question underpinning the reasons 
for changing vessels in the South African west coast rock lobster fishery and how often the 
right holders change their nominated fishing vessels.  
 
Reasons for changing of vessels 
There are several reasons provided by boat change applicants as the causes for changing 
fishing vessels. These reasons range from investments in the fishery, safety at sea, engine 
breakdown of the vessel, expensive catching charter fee to financial difficulties. In the 
analysis, the reasons have been put into ten categories as follows Investments and share 
holding; Safety at sea; Vessel owners with financial difficulties; Vessel breakdown; Charter 
fee; Catching agreement break down; Many right holders in one vessel; Boat selling; Shortage 
in catch  and Miscellaneous reasons. In the small scale fishing sector in South Africa most 
right holders do not have their own vessels to harvest their quotas, right holders depend on 
company owned vessels or individual owners for their quotas to be caught and they may 
require replacing the vessels (DEAT, 2005).  
In relation to the investment and share holding, the long term rights allocation policy requires 
the right holders to invest in the fishery as stated:  
“Investment in a vessel nominated to harvest the resource and other fixed assets will 
be recognized as long as that investment demonstrates a genuine intention to share the 
risk of participation in the sector. The level of investment will be assessed with the 
reference to the quantum held during the medium term rights allocation process
20
” 
                                                           
20
 General policy on the allocation and management of long term commercial fishing rights: 2005, Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism. 
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As stated earlier, in order to own fishing vessels most right holders rent a fishing vessel to 
harvest their quota. The fisheries department in South Africa had recognized that once the 
allocation of long term fishing rights is done, the right holders will introduce new vessels into 
the fishery (DEAT, 2005). After the allocation of long term rights, the right holders have been 
changing from their current harvesting vessel. The reason being some of the right holders 
have bought their own new vessel to invest in the fishery, and they apply for a change from 
current vessel owned by the leasing company or individual owners to the replacement vessel 
(fishing vessel that the right holder wishes to use). In some cases the right holders apply for a 
change from current vessel to the replacement vessel because they have shares in it.  
The right holders buy shares from the companies owning vessels or from individual owners so 
as to own a particular share percentage in the vessel, Investment in a vessel and other fixed 
assets are recognized as long as the investment demonstrates a genuine intention to share risk 
of participating in the sector (MCM, 2005)
21
. Before the application for commercial fishing 
rights were allocated rights in 2005, applicants had to show access or ownership to a vessel 
for harvesting a particular resource. In some fisheries applicants have to provide a business 
plan for the fishing operations indicating financial viability of the fisher or the company 
(PREM, 2005). This category of investment and shareholding accounts for 26% of the reasons 
stated by the applicants of vessel changes in all the processed vessel approval documents. 
In all the fisheries in South Africa vessels operating prior from being allowed to the sector 
undergoes a safety test by the South African Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA). For the 
safety of staff and crew applicants have to comply with the regulatory requirements of 
SAMSA Act 5 of 1998 and the regulations promulgated in terms of the Merchant Shipping 
Act, 57 of 1951 (MCM, 2005).  SAMSA approves the vessels if it is seaworthy to operate. 
Through the application of the vessel change right holders also provide a SAMSA certificate 
of the vessel they are going to use. In the WCRL nearshore fishery the right holders 
sometimes use smaller vessels, so they frequently change to larger vessels, but not more than 
8 meters, as this is the maximum length of the required vessel in the sector. Fishing operations 
are conducted under various environmental conditions, and depending on the region of 
                                                           
21
  Right holders who bought shares at a minimum costs or no costs at all are not recognized as investment and 
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operation, bad weather may hamper the fishing vessels. This is what the applicants mention as 
their reason for changing of the vessel “the old vessel is traditional unsafe and the weather 
conditions in his region would not allow him to reach fishing grounds and I feel like I will not 
get my all allocation with the current vessel” and other right holder had mentioned “the 
current vessel is too small to handle the bad weather they are experiencing in the area”. 
Right holders feel safe on larger vessels than on the small ones. One of the vessel change 
applicants has mentioned that “the previous vessel is too small and unsafe, there is no 
working space for the skipper, trawl man and the right holders and this vessel is going to be 
used for recreational purposes”   
Regarding multiple right holders on one vessel, the vessel owners normally accept many right 
holders to harvest their quotas and end up not harvesting all the quotas. The right holders tend 
to change to other vessels because the current vessel is oversubscribed and they fear that his 
or her quota will not be harvested. Often the vessel owner end up releasing some of the right 
holders to look for other vessels to catch their quotas as they see that they cannot catch the 
entire quota for the right holders they have accepted. One of the applicant mentions “the 
current vessel has no capacity to harvest the volume of all the boat nominees in one season, 
so it releases some of its right holders”. 
Economic efficiency studies conducted by FAO indicate the costs within the vessels depend 
on the basis of the fishery scale. The small scale fishing vessels capital costs in South Africa 
range from six to sixteen percent of the net costs, as the fuel and running costs are the greatest 
expense. On the medium and large scale, labour costs which are part of the operating costs, 
are noticeably higher and also the vessel costs higher (FAO, 2005). 
 The fuel costs in South Africa are very high, and many vessel owners in the small scale 
fisheries find themselves at financial difficulties to go to the sea. Regarding fuel prices, one of 
the vessel change applicant mentions “the vessel owner released the applicant because of the 
limited quota and the fuel costs will be high while the catch cannot cover the costs” and 
another applicant mentions “the vessel owner refused to go to the sea as the fuel costs are 
very high”. As the fuel prices rise now and again the vessel owners have to find ways to get 
out of the financial crisis. Of all the applicants documents vessel owners with financial 
difficulties account for eight percent. The category of boat selling will also apply here, vessels 
owners when they are in financial crisis they begin to their sell their boats. Keeping the boats 
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by themselves is expensive and the only option for them to sell the vessel. The right holders 
changing their nominated vessel due to the owner of the vessel selling the boat is about four 
percent. According to FAO about 60 percent of the commercial operational fleets are ageing 
and more than 20 years old (FAO, 2005)
22
. Since these vessels are old, they need maintenance 
and repair which is often very expensive, and this category account for fourteen percent
23
. 
The bad weather on the west coast damages some vessels, and some vessel owners do not 
have means for repair costs. 
On the issue of the charter fee, the quota holders who do not own a vessel rent a vessel from 
the companies or certain individual vessel owners. The right holder and the vessel owner 
make a catch agreement, which should be provided at the MCM during application for change 
of vessel. In the WCRL nearshore fishery, the cost of harvesting for a particular right holder 
ranges from fifteen rand per kilogram to thirty rand per kilogram. The amount they agree on 
depends to a large extent on the skipper of the vessel. About eight percent of the right holders 
change to other replacement vessels to obtain cheaper harvesting costs. Some applicants for a 
vessel change mention on their applications that “the applicant had a bad service from the 
nominated vessels and has a better offer in the replacement vessels” and the others mentions 
reasons such as “the charter fee of the nominated vessels is too high and the applicants has a 
better offer on the replacement vessel”.  
There are various more specific reasons given by the right holders wishing to change their 
nominated vessels such as:  
• The client wants to change to a more reliable vessel that will catch his fish, had lots of 
problems with the nominated vessel owner. 
• The vessel owner has long been sick and doctor advised him not to go to the sea. 
• The current vessel is going to operate on another fishing sector, the traditional line 
fishery. 
• The applicant has no contacts with the nominated vessel owner. 
                                                           
22
 The percentage of the aging vessels refers to overall operational fleet in the South African fisheries. 
23
 About fourteen percent of right holders are stating that maintenance of the vessel is very expensive and are 
changing their nominated fishing vessel due to the costs of maintaining fishing vessel. 
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Sometimes the right holders have catch agreements with vessel operating on other sectors 
which put them at risk of not harvesting the quota during the season because they are busy in 
other fisheries. Some of the vessels are not only involved in one sector, they are also 
operating on other fisheries such as the traditional line fishery. In case of the sick vessel 
owner, SAMSA provides safety training course for the crews and skippers, and if the persons 
are not medically fit they are not allowed to go to the sea. The vessel owners are said to be 
unreliable creating problems with right holders and some right holders do not have contact at 
all with the vessels owner and probably the owner is operating from another harbor. Some of 
the right holders require only a an additional vessel for harvesting their quotas, as in the area 7 
and area 8
24
 catch rates of the west rock lobster are very low. The right holders need the 
additional vessel as to increase the fishing effort to finish their quotas in time, and they have 
fear that the season will be closed without the catch of the full quota for them. Figure 5.1 
represents the reasons which give more weight on the processed documents for the changing 
of the vessels. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Reasons for the change of the vessels represented graphically by percentage 
 
                                                           
24
 See map in the background of the fishery chapter 
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The department of fisheries (MCM) in South Africa has recognized that after the allocation of 
long term commercial fishing rights the new entrants who do not own fishing vessels will 
seek to introduce new vessels or they may require replacing current nominated vessels. In 
South Africa overcapacity is one of the primary threats to the resources and put burdens on 
monitoring and enforcing compliance. Introduction of effort limitations are implied where 
necessary to limit the effort and the ageing vessel are recognized to be replaced
25
. Any 
cumulative effect in effort is carefully monitored by the introduction of new vessels into the 
fleet, right holders are not permitted to introduce vessels that are capable of excess capacity in 
their allocations (DEAT, 2005). The squid fishery and the traditional line fishery are the two 
fishery sectors that follow some certain rules regarding issues with changing of vessels
26
. 
In the squid fishery sector the applicants nominated vessels are assigned to length categories 
which determines the maximum number of persons per vessel (DEAT, 2005). If the applicants 
were to apply for a change of nominated vessel to a replacement vessel, they have to change 
within the same category they belong to. For instance in category three, the vessel length is 13 
meters to 15 meters which allows a crew of 16 persons. A right holder changing the vessel to 
another category would be intensifying the fishing effort in the fishery, and hence increase the 
problems of overcapacity.  
In relation with the traditional line fish sector, the fishing right holders are allowed to change 
their nominated vessels with regard to the length, a length of two meters increment is allowed 
to any right holder who wishes to change from the nominated vessel to a replacement vessel. 
But this change can only be done once, and a new change to a larger vessel after the first 
change is not permitted. 
Currently MCM has no legitimate and illegitimate reasons or rules for changing of vessels 
that are in place which can be used as guidelines. The department uses bits and pieces in the 
policies of the fisheries, most of the fisheries policies mention only suitable fishing vessels, 
and when a right holder wishes to change a vessel, would do accordingly to a suitable vessel. 
In the WCRL fishery there is a proposal that, if a right holder wishes to change a vessel that is 
                                                           
25
 See Ref. (20) 
26
 Upon changing or replacing a vessel, a right holder has to follow those rules. Breaking of those rules is 
regarded as illegitimate. 
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already operating in the fishery he does not need to apply for a vessel change, and should only 
notify the department that he or she is using a particular vessel, unless the vessel is operating 
in different fishery, but it is not yet in place. The Fishing Effort Advisory Committee (FEAC) 
had been responsible for the changes in vessels in MCM; Feike stated that FEAC had been 
making its own rules in allowing vessel changes. There was a case in the pelagic sector and 
swordfish sector which MCM did not allow the foreign flagged states to harvest the resource, 
Feike (2008) regarded this as illegitimate because South Africa does not have the capital and 
skills to harvest the resource.  MCM had also gone against the United Nations Convection 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) where a sovereign coastal state is unable to fully harvest domestic 
resource should allow foreign flagged states to harvest the balance. 
 
How often do right holders change their fishing vessels? 
From the MCM catch data for the WCRL nearshore sector, it clearly shows the fishing vessels 
each right holder had used to harvest their quota. The catch data indicates how many fishing 
vessels a right had used throughout the fishing season. There are three seasons observed from 
2006 to 2009, during the season of 2006/2007 in total of the right holders 21.15 % changed 
their nominated fishing vessel. In the following seasons of 2007/2008 and 2008/2009 about 
16.01 % and 2.3 % respectively indicate that right holders have used more than one vessel to 
harvest their quotas. The WCRL fishery had been recognized as leading fishery in receiving 
most applications for the vessel changes in both offshore and inshore fisheries.  
  
Figure 5.2: Trend of the vessel changes in the west coast rock lobster nearshore fishery 
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The figure above illustrates the trend of vessel changes by the right holders in the WCRL 
nearshore fishery in the last three seasons. According to the past three seasons there has been 
a dramatic decrease in number of right holders changing vessels about 14 % decrease in the 
2008/2009 season from the previous season, however as stated by Feike (2008) that quota 
holders change vessels now and again and some more than the others, this decline in the 
vessel changes may have positive impacts on government, notably in administration, in terms 
of administering and recording of vessel changes. The declined number of right holders 
changing vessels is an indication of decreasing the work load in processing of the 
applications. Most of the right holders changed vessels through investments; the declining 
trend provides the indication of potential redistribution of access rights and fishing capital. 
Now right holders own their vessels. 
In the WCRL nearshore fishery there were 823 right holders in 2006 and 207 of these right 
holders have changed their nominated vessels, and again in season 2007/2008 and 2008/2009 
there were 824 and 825 right holders in which 132 and 19 respectively used more than one 
fishing vessel. The table below demonstrates the number of right holders who had changed 
the nominated vessels in the last seasons.  
Table 5.1: The number of right holders changed vessels per season 




Fleet capacity (no. 
of vessels) 
2006/2007 823 207 391 
2007/2008 824 132 399 
2008/2009 825 19 380 
 
As we can recall from the background of the WCRL nearshore fishery there are fishing are 
fishing grounds which are divided into six fishing zones (Zones A to F), Zone A to Zone C 
each consisting of two fishing areas (Area 1 to 6), and Zone D divided to four areas (Area 7 to 
10)
27
. There are also geographically separated small fishing areas which have been formed to 
                                                           
27
 See map in the background chapter (2) of the fishery. 
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Zone E (Area 11) and Zone F (Area 12, 13 and 14). The TAC is distributed according to these 
zones. Both season 2006/2007 and 2007/2008 had the same allocation of the quota, Zone A 
allocations category were with right holders allocated 1000 kg and 500 kg and Zone B, Zone 
D and Zone E allocated 750 kg and 500 kg.  
The other zones C and F had three categories with Zone C allocated 750 kg, 500 kg and 250 
kg while Zone F with 750 kg, 500 kg and 321 kg. In the season 2008/2009 it was a different 
case with the TACs lower, Zone A allocated 807 kg and 403 kg, Zone B with 606 kg and 402 
kg while Zone C with 600 kg, 400 kg and 200 kg. Then Zone D and Zone E had the same 
allocation of 603 kg and 402 kg, however Zone F was allocated 603 kg, 402 kg and 258 kg. 
The allocations depend on the abundance in the area or zone a right holder applied for, and 
investment in the fishery and job creation (MCM, 2005). The figure below illustrates the right 
holders changed a fishing vessel with respect to the quota allocated. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Right holders change vessel according to quota allocated.  
Of all these allocations in each season it is notably that right holders allocated 750 kg 
dominate fishing vessel changes during both 2006/2007 and 2007/2008 except 2008/2009 
because there were no allocations of 750 kg. During the season 2006/2007 about 60 % of the 
right holders allocated 750 kg changed their nominated vessels and allocation of 500 kg 
accounts 27 %, and the of the allocations share the remaining 13 %. In the season 2007/2008 
the allocation category with 750 kg accounts for 63 % and the 500 kg category with 23 % and 
the rest share 14% remaining. In the last observed season of 2008/2009 right holders allocated 
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603 kg dominate the change of vessel and accounts about 63 % while right holders allocated 
402 kg account the remaining 27 %.   
In the WCRL vessels changes has been a problem through too many applications for changing 
of vessels, but there other problem that exists is the issue of capacity. The capacity in the west 
coast nearshore fishery sector has been stable in the past three seasons (2006 to 2009) which 
the capacity has been determined in terms of quantity of vessels per season. In the 2006/2007 
season there were 391 vessels, and the following season the vessels slightly increased to 399. 
In the 2008/2009 season the harvesting vessels decrease from 399 to 380, as table 5.1 
illustrates the number of vessels per season. Marther (2004) argues that the entry and the exit 
of vessels within a fishery are largely determined by the TAC, and also declining TAC 
indicates a fall in the number of vessels. The TAC depends on the previous year harvest and 
environmental factors affecting the fishery. 
 The TAC for the WCRL nearshore during the season 2006/2007 and 2007/2008 was the 
same, although the TAC was stable the number of vessels increased in the 2007/2008 season 
by additional seven boats. In the season 2008/2009, Mather’s proportion of TAC to the 
number of vessels proved to be correct as the number of vessels declined about nineteen 
vessels from the previous year number. The WCRL fishery itself is severely depleted with the 
exploitable biomass at about three percent and spawner biomass at approximately nine 
percent, which is why the TAC is declining on the fishery. The declining of the TAC could 
not be the only reason behind the exiting of some vessels; probably there are some underlying 
reasons for the declining vessels.  
In the WCRL nearshore fishery the numbers of vessels have declined and also the number of 
right holders who have changed their current vessels also decreased dramatically. Since the 
trend of the right holders changing vessels has gone down especially in the last observed 
season, this could be the indication of the right holders are satisfied with their current vessels. 
This could be that right holders are operating in safer vessels now and feel safe with more 
working space in vessels and also cheaper charter fee meaning that they are harvesting with 
lesser prices as before. In some cases that right holders are now owning their own vessels. 
Some of the vessels which were operating in different fisheries probably are concentrating in 
one fishery since the TAC is declining in the WCRL and this could be one of the reasons of 
the declining vessels in the sector.  
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Chapter 6: What can be learned by the South African fishing industry from 
other fishing nations? 
 
Introduction 
This chapter dwells on the strategies used in other countries in dealing with vessel 
replacement issues. The countries chosen as illustrations case are Canada and Australia. 
 
The Canadian fishery  
The Canadian fisheries exploits over 100 commercial valuable species of fish and the fishing 
industry operates on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and also about 800 freshwater lakes. The 
fishing industry in Canada consists of marine, inland, aquaculture and recreational fisheries. 
With the marine fisheries operating both offshore and inshore concentrating on groundfish 
fishery, while inland and freshwater fisheries are relatively low in catches and value (Pitcher 
et al., 2002). One of the major commercial fisheries in Canada is in the marine ecosystem off 
Newfoundland and Labrador, a fishery which is over five hundred years old. The major 
commercial fisheries have sustained harvests over the centuries; these fisheries include cod 
fishery, crab and shrimp fisheries and the groundfish fishery. These fisheries have shown 
some signs of stress whereas the cod fishery has already collapsed (Murray et al., 2008). The 
cod fishery in Canada collapsed in the early 1990s and has never recovered. This fishery was 
the foundation of the Newfoundland and Labrador fisheries and during the 1960s the 
groundfish fishery was severely damaged by foreign fishing vessels (Schrank, 2005).  
Currently Newfoundland and Labrador fisheries have experienced a decline of approximately 
25 % of the landed value of all species. In this province the Canadian government launched 
Fishing Industry Renewal Initiative with the purpose of tackling the problems and challenges 
facing the Newfoundland and Labrador fishing industry. The Fishing Industry Renewal 
Initiative (FIRI) was formed to pursue approaches for conservation, stock rebuilding and long 
term sustainability of the resource, all of which were of paramount importance. of all these 
objectives had to remain a paramount. The FIRI was based more on contributing ecologically 
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sustainable industry and achieving better balance between resource availability and harvesting 
capacity (FIRI, 2006). ). In the Newfoundland and Labrador fishery there were too many fish 
plant, too many fish plants workers and too many fishermen for a commercially viable 
industry (Schrank, 2005).  
Parsons (1998) argues in his paper that in most Canadian Atlantic groundfish fisheries 
capacity exceeds what is required to harvest that a resource and there is a reduction of up to 
40 % to 50 % in both processing and harvesting is required for the future viability of the 
fishery. In the groundfish fishery the conservation objectives were to prevent the increase in 
harvesting capacity and to avoid catching of small fish through mesh regulations or gear 
limitations (FRCC, 1997). There were also other regulatory measures applied which included 
limited entry licensing, a vessel replacement policy, quota management with fleet sector 
allocations and enterprise allocations and ITQs. The FIRI had addressed the problem of 
capacity in the groundfish fishery and the approach from the Initiative was a long-term 
approach to vessel replacement policy which would allow safe, viable and less competitive 
fisheries instead of output controls (Parsons, 1998).  
The vessel replacement policy of Fisheries and Oceans Canada was introduced in the early 
1980s. The policy was developed for the vessels less than 20 meters in length and was 
intended to reduce the growth of harvesting capacity in competitive fisheries. Under this 
policy the capacity is defined in terms of length and cubic meter measurements (FIRI, 2006), 
and hence the replacement policy controlled the vessel length which proved to be the only one 
factor in fishing power (FRCC, 1997). Currently the policy is still in effect. The 
Supplementary Replacement Rules have developed for vessels from 10 meters to 20 meters, 
under this rules an approach in changing of vessels was developed in 2003. Fishers wishing to 
change their harvesting vessels had to make a proposal which will be assessed with the 
guidance of the ten vessel replacement guideline principles (FIRI, 2006).  
The vessel replacement guideline principles are as follows adopted from FIRI (2006):  
Vessel replacement proposals should: 
1. “Not compromise conservation and sustainable utilization” 
2. “Not increase (and preferably reduce) overall harvesting capacity.” 
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3. “Encourage the adoption of self-adjustment mechanisms”. 
4. “Not compromise safety and be consistent with the policies and regulations of other 
agencies responsible for vessel safety”. 
5. “Contribute to improved economic viability and not generate pressures for expanded 
allocations”. 
6. “Not result in any changes in allocations, fleet shares or access”. 
7. “Be readily enforceable”. 
8. “Be consistent with the objectives of current licensing policy.” 
9. “Take into account that fishing enterprises may hold licenses for more than one 
fishery.” 
10. “Only permit Core license holders to benefit from changes to rules”.       
Basically the Canadian replacement policy was developed to serve three basic purposes; the 
vessel size and the conservation issue; orderly management of fisheries and policy on capacity 
management. 
 
Vessel size and the conservation issue 
The Canadian replacement policy is based exclusively on the length of the vessel which 
happened to be the only factor in defining fishing power, as larger vessels have a greater 
capacity to catch fish
28
.  The larger vessels operate further offshore and faster and in terms of 
gear they carry more sophisticated gear and larger room for the storage of catch. Increase in 
fishing effort result from the newer vessels which carry navigation systems, more 
sophisticated gear and cover more fishing ground, and vessel length is only one aspect of 
capacity. 







- 60 - 
 
According to FRCC (1997), in the 1980s the smaller vessels were not able to operate further 
offshore so only fished close to their homeports, but gradually technology improvements in 
the smaller vessels gave them capability to further operate offshore. Although the licenses in 
the groundfish fishery were constant, the capacity of the fleet to find and catch fish greatly 
increased through technological innovations. This has meant that through these changes the 
Hache` Task Force in 1989 concluded that the vessel replacement rules had not been effective 
in limiting fishing capacity (FRCC, 1997). 
Generally the replacement of vessels has an implication in conservation of the fish stocks. The 
rules are intended to define type and size of vessel in most fisheries which would support 
viable enterprises within sustainable harvesting levels without undue pressure to overexploit. 
In the replacement policy vessels size helps to maintain the sustainable balance between the 




Orderly management of fisheries 
The replacement rules in Canada were developed in competitive fisheries. The Task Force on 
Incomes and Adjustments in the Atlantic fishery had declared there are too many harvesters 
using too many boats and too many fishing processing plants (FRCC, 1997). All these people 
are competing for the same limited resource, and individuals race to catch the quota as much 
as possible. The replacement rules were set in place with the intention to stabilize fleets and 
ensure that an appropriate number have a chance to take a reasonable share of the resource
30
.  
In some fisheries replacement rules may limit competition between fleets.  
 
Policy on capacity management 
The control of fishing effort and vessel capacity has been a goal in Canada and internationally 
for fisheries management. The harvesting capacity has been long standing problem in all 
sectors in Canada, and overcapacity has resulted in non-viable fishing enterprises, low and 
                                                           
29
 See ref. 28 
30
 See ref. 28 
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unstable income levels, low vessel utilization rates and an inability to attract and retain skilled 
crew (FIRI, 2006). There has been a decrease in registered vessels in the Canadian offshore 
fleets, but the accumulation of effective effort is due to the technological improvements in the 
fleets (FRCC, 1997). Canada is a member of the FAOs International Plan of Action on the 
Management of Fishing Capacity, and FAO has taken the lead in developing international 
policies and guidelines for the conservation of the resources. In the groundfish fishery, there 
have been several adjustment programs, including the Core License Policy which was 
introduced in 1995. This policy does not allow increment in harvesting when there is a new 
fishery opened or an existing fishery has expanded
31
. 
Safety at sea 
In the Atlantic fisheries safety at sea is a growing concern Canada transport and other 
provincial agencies have been responsible for health and safety in the work place by 
developing more stringent rules and training
32
. All the vessels must meet safety standards, 
minimum stability requirements and should provide accommodation for the crew (Parsons, 
1998).  
 
The Australian Northern Prawn Fishery 
 
The Northern Prawn Fishery (NPF) is located off Australian north coast and covers an area 
approximately 800 000 square km. The fishery targets nine commercial species of prawn, and 
squid as opportunistic target species along with scallops and bugs (Newby et al., 2004). The 
fishery was established commercially in the 1960s, the tiger prawn and the banana prawn 
fishery accounting for 80 % of the commercial prawn species landings (Kompas et al., 2003). 
The prawn fishery is divided into two main seasons, the daylight time fishing season targeting 
schooling banana prawns and night time fishing tiger prawn (Newby et al., 2004). The NPF is 
regarded as the most valuable Australian commercial fishery (Jarret, undated).  
                                                           
31
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The management of the NPF has been developed to address the issues of fishing effort levels 
and biological sustainability issues and also other objective for the management is the 
economic efficiency of the fleet (Kompas et al., 2003). The Northern Prawn Fishery 
Management Plan of 1995 currently manages the NPF and is based on the limited entry and 
input controls, the input controls are the number of trawlers that may fish in the fishery, the 
size of the trawler used for fishing and the power of the main engine (Jarret, undated). The 
fishery has been regulated by limited entry since 1977 to prevent overharvesting, restricting 
the number of vessel in the fishery (Kompas et al., 2003). The limited entry was revised in 
1980 and was implemented under three year management plan, this plan proved to be 
ineffective because of replacement of old fishing vessels with new vessels which reduce the 
effectiveness of the management plan. In accordance with the increasing fishing effort 
Northern Prawn Management Advisory Committee (NORMAC) was formed in 1984, 
NORMAC introduced management plan class A units and class B. In the management plan 
introduced, a vessel required one class A unit for each cubic meter of hull volume and each 
kilowatt of engine power, while class B units limited the number of vessels licensed to 
operate in the fishery (Newby et al., 2004). 
Even then the stock of the brown prawn continued to decline, the failure of the limited entry 
policy to control expansion of fishing capacity and effort led to introduction of the unitization 
system for the rating of each vessel, and to hold increment in fishing capacity through boat 
replacement restrictions (Jarret, undated). The boat replacement policy was introduced in 
1985, designed to reduce capacity of the fishing fleet. Upon this policy vessel owners wishing 
to improve their vessels or want to use new vessel were required to surrender A-units equal to 
the number of A-units of the upgraded vessel. The vessel owners were also required to 
acquire A-units from the license holders and prevent capacity increase within the existing 
fleet (Kompas et al., 2003). According to Newby et al. (2004), the vessel replacement policy 
required the vessel owners to surrender two class B units for a new vessel of any size. Later 
the policy was revised and the vessel owners wishing to upgrade or introduce a new vessel 
were obliged to surrender class A-units and the vessel license so that at least the other vessel 
is removed from the fishery. 
The vessel replacement and restrictions on the vessel length and engine power have been used 
to supplement the limited licensing in Australia. These supplementary controls proved to be 
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effective in restraining fishing effort but vessel replacement in some areas adversely affected 
efficiency
33
. Through the boat replacement policy east coast trawlers were discouraged to 
improve to more powerful vessels. Upon purchasing new vessel owners were required to 
surrender one additional license upon upgrading. It was referred to as two for one replacement 
policy. Although it was effective in slowing the rate of increase in fishing power, it had effect 
of increasing the average age of the fleet (O’Neill et al., 2003). It was also argued that the 
fishing power of an average fishing vessel in the fleet is continuing to increase due to 
technological advances in fishing gear and vessel performance, navigation systems and 
telecommunications. A new system of management in the NPF which is based on gear was 
implemented in 1990s. It was to replace the unitization system which had been ineffective due 
to the technology creep, innovation in trawler designs and engine configurations. In addition 
legislators had been unable to enforce the rules on boat size and engine horsepower, thus 
resulting in uncontrollable effort creep
34
.   
 
A suitable management system 
Replacement guidelines 
The fishing vessel replacement policy has been implemented in Canada and Australia with 
intentions of using them as a management tool to reduce harvesting capacity and limit 
competition between various fleets. In the South African fishing industry context, it takes us 
back to the research statement, where South Africa does not have documented guidelines in 
place for the changing or replacement of fishing vessels. South Africa needs to develop and 
document guidelines on fishing vessel replacement which may address administrative issues 
as well as vessel issues amongst the right holders. If South African fishing authorities wishing 
to develop fishing vessel guidelines should take a note of Levelton saying about vessel 
replacement, which he states:  
“Replacement guidelines should not be overly rigid and not the same for all fisheries, 
even on a relative basis. A balance must be struck between permitting technological 
                                                           
33
 http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/AC750E/AC750E11.htm. accessed 25 September 2009 
34
 http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y2498e/y2498e0a.htm. Accessed 25 September 2009 
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increase but controlling it so that it does not get out of hand. The management 
objective for each fishery must take active account of the technological and associated 
economic and biological consequences of vessel replacement allowances” (Levelton, 
1981). 
The vessel replacement policy in Canada has been reviewed more than three times, and also 
in recent years it has been supplemented with other vessel replacement principles. According 
to FIRI (2006) this has made the policy administratively complex system of rules that are 
largely ineffective. The fisheries in both countries used as cases in this study have different 
fisheries compared to South African fisheries. The South African authorities could develop a 
very simple and non-complex policy by taking into account these countries policies and 
relating to South African fisheries. 
Firstly, putting vessel guidelines in the South African fisheries may address administrative 
issues as well as vessel issues amongst right holders. Development of a simple understandable 
policy may bring less administrative work upon the processing of vessel change requests. The 
fishing replacement guidelines can improve a system of allowing vessel changes among right 
holders, as in the Newfoundland ground fishery where number of license holders wishing to 
replace their vessels has decrease through replacement guidelines. 
The fishing replacement guidelines have been considered as very efficient in limiting 
harvesting capacity. In the South African fishing industry some of the fisheries are facing the 
problem of overcapacity, and regulations currently in place range from input and output 
controls to temporary closed areas and also Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). According to 
King (2007), in a fishery without a replacement policy or restriction, fishers tend to replace 
older vessel with larger, more efficient vessels resulting in the increase of fishing effort and 
yet on the other hand, not allowing the vessels to be replaced may result in an increase of an 
average age and inefficiency of vessels and with operations conducted in unsafe boats. 
In terms of capacity management, vessel replacement and license limitations in Canada have 
been inefficient in tackling the increase of harvesting capacity but in Australia the system has 
proved to be efficient. The fishing replacement principle in the Canada which states: “Not 
increase (and preferably reduce) overall harvesting capacity” This principle could be the 
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answer in increasing overcapacity especially in Total Allowable Effort (TAE) fisheries in 
South Africa. 
The issue of sea safety has been important in these two countries. In Canada the boat license 
holders had to abide to the principle which states “Not compromise safety and be consistent 
with the policies and regulations of other agencies responsible for vessel safety”. According 
to FIRI (2006) this principle has led to economic unviable and poor designs of the Canadian 
fleet. The boat builders had to build larger boats which are more stable at sea, good for safety 
but the boats are very slow and consume more fuel. Upon this problem faced by Canadian 
fleet, South Africa could at the same combine together the safety principle with the economic 
viability principle which states “ Contribute to improved economic viability and not generate 
pressures for expanded allocations”. These combinations could alert boat makers to improve 
their designs taking into account the economic viability and safety of the fishing vessels.   
The fishing vessel replacement guidelines in these fishing nations had  more or less the same 
objective, but they have not been successful as they were intended to. In Canada the guideline 
have inefficient and in Australia they have been successful because these nations have 
different fisheries in both biological and economic terms. South Africa should take into 
consideration biology, economic and political issues upon developing and implementing of 
the fishing vessel guidelines.  
 
Alternative management system 
The ITQ system 
In top of the fishing replacement guidelines that these fishing nations have implemented, they 
also implemented individual transferable quotas (ITQs). The ITQs had brought effectiveness 
in Canada supplementing the replacement rules, as it is the same case in Australia.  
The individual transferable quotas are a form of property rights that have commonly used 
around the world. The ITQs have been implemented in several fishing nations such as New 
Zealand, Chile, Canada, Iceland and Greenland (Arnason, 2005). The ITQs are a type of 
rights based management in fisheries in which are enforce and allocated in the form of access 
and use rights, so ITQs allocate total allowable catch as an individual harvesting right 
 
 
- 66 - 
 
(Grafton, 1996).  Arnason (2005) claims that ITQs can bring economic benefits as it has been 
experienced in Iceland where the system has led to increased economic efficiency. Grafton 
(1996) also assumes that there are benefits from this system such as reduction of excess 
capital employed in the fishery, the potential opportunities in alternative activities and the 
removal of excess harvesting capacity over a period of several years through adjustments. The 
system had been implemented in the above countries relating to a case in South African 
fishing industry and the ITQ system proved effective in both countries together with the 
replacement guidelines. There are number of measures applied in South Africa to 
sustainability of the stocks, ranging from closed season, MPAs, type of gear to be used and 
also prevention of harvesting juvenile’s catches.  The implementation of such system in South 
Africa could solve competition problems, overcapacity and economic efficiencies in most 
fisheries.  
Although the ITQs had brought success in these nations, South Africa is a different case for 
the implementation of ITQs. The fishing authorities should take account of transformation, 
ownership and equity upon implementing ITQs. The ITQs may solve problems of “race for 
fish” and may provide substantial advantages of increased economic rent, reduced 
overcapitalization, improved safety and better product (Branch et al., 2006). The problems 
with ITQs vary according to countries policies and objectives. In South Africa ITQs could 
reverse the transformation of the fishing industry, where the large companies could buy out 
the developing small enterprises, and may create paper quotas. The ITQs are also associated 
with the loss of employment as fleets are reduced (Branch et al., 2006).  South Africa is 
currently facing high unemployment rate, then ITQs can cause more problems in the South 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and recommendations 
 
Introduction 
The previous two chapters of the study deal with the analysis and findings as well as what can 
be learned from other fishing nations. As mentioned in the first chapter the study seeks to 
identify the main reasons why the right holders change their fishing vessels and how often the 
right holders change these fishing vessels. The study also focuses on what can be learned 
from the other fishing nations with fishing vessels replacement rules as a management tool. 
This chapter gives a brief description of the relevant issues in findings. 
 
Conclusions  
The replacement of fishing vessels in South Africa can be linked to theories of capacity 
management which were discussed extensively in chapter three. In the past three seasons the 
capacity of the fleet in the WCRL nearshore fishery has been stable in terms of number of 
vessels. The TAC in the WCRL nearshore has been determined largely by the entry and exit 
of the fishing vessels. Although the capacity in the WCRL nearshore fishery has been stable 
in terms of number of vessels, the fishing capacity can be increased through the vessel 
changes. The right holders in the WCRL nearshore fishery have been changing their current 
vessels seeking to utilize larger vessels. The claim is that larger vessels are safer and can 
withstand bad weather at sea. The larger vessels have greater capacity and are more efficient 
because they cover more fishing grounds and have a larger space for the labour crew. These 
larger vessels have contributed to the increased fishing capacity in the South African fleet as 
well as right holders introducing new vessels.     
 
Reasons for changing of fishing vessels  
Based on the findings of the study most right holders have changed from their current vessels 
through investments. These investments vary from joint ventures, shareholding and 
purchasing of new or old vessels from the established companies. The study reveals that the 
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fishers have shown development in their fishing enterprises as well as success in 
transformation of the South African fishing industry.  
Upon right holders replacing their current fishing vessels, safety measures are taken into 
considerations. The South African fishing authority is very cautious for the safety of the staff 
and crew at sea. All the fishing vessels that are operating in South African waters undergo a 
safety test conducted by SAMSA. The WCRL nearshore fishery right holders provide the 
SAMSA certificate when they apply for a vessel replacement. Most of the right holders are 
more concerned with their safety at sea, so they apply for a change to larger and safer vessels.  
The South African fishing industry is in the process of transformation, and most of the right 
holders do not own fishing vessels. This has led to problems that right holders rent fishing 
vessels from the established companies or individual vessel owners that are oversubscribed. 
When these vessels are oversubscribed they have to release other right holders to seek fishing 
vessels to harvest their remaining quotas.  This has caused problems with right holders ending 
up not harvesting their full quotas. 
The economic crisis has an influence in fishing replacement vessel of the South African 
fishing fleet. The rising fuel prices and also increased running costs of the vessels leave the 
vessel owners in a financial crisis. When the operating costs are very high the vessel owners 
do not want to go to sea. Sometimes the fishing vessels are broken and maintenance costs are 
expensive. The vessel owners end up releasing right holders to seek for vessels to harvest 
their remaining quotas. The financial difficulties amongst the fleets can be linked with the 
charter fee agreement between chartering parties. When the operating cost is very high the 
vessel owner will require a higher harvesting fee. The right holders then leave the expensive 
catch agreements for better offers to achieve cheaper harvesting costs. 
The right holders also provide many other reasons upon changing their current vessels. These 
reasons may be that “the fishing vessel is operating in another sector that the vessel owner is 
sick, that he is not fit to go to the sea and that right holder needs an additional vessel to 
harvest his quota due to low abundance of lobster in the area where the right holder is 




- 69 - 
 
 
How often do the right holders change their current harvesting vessels? 
In the past three seasons investigated of 2006/2007, 2007/2008 and 2008/2009 in this study 
the number of right holders changing their vessels has decreased. The decrease in the number 
of right holders changing vessels is an indication of decreasing work load on the 
administration in processing vessel change applications. The decreasing number of right 
holders changing vessels also reveals that the right holders are more satisfied with the service 
of their current vessels as well as potential redistribution of access rights and fishing capital. 
Now the right holders have their own vessels. 
 
The fishing vessel replacement guidelines 
As stated earlier in the introductory chapter that South African fishing industry does not have 
fishing vessel replacement guidelines. The South African fishing authorities need to develop 
and document guidelines for fishing vessel changes. The study seeks the base in development 
of fishing vessels replacement guidelines if the South African fishing authority intends to 
introduce a policy. In the last chapter, two fishing nations; Canada and Australia have been 
used as cases in fishing vessel replacement policies. The vessel replacement guidelines have 
been used as management tool of fishing capacity in these nations, and have been considered 
very efficient. 
In the WCRL nearshore fishery harvesting capacity, safety at sea and economic viability of 
the fleet have been linked with the fishing vessel replacement guidelines used in Canada. In 
both the WCRL fisheries, the offshore and the nearshore sector, they have a large number of 
industry players which leave the industry vulnerable to excess effort (BCMLE, 2006). In the 
WCRL nearshore fishery alone, the last three seasons access fishing rights were awarded to 
more than 820 individuals. In this fishery there are too many right holders and too many 
fishing vessels operating with numerous artisanal fishers who lost their original open access to 
the resource. The WCRL nearshore sector has more than 350 fishing boats in past three years 
from 2006 to 2009.  
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The changing of fishing vessels in the WCRL nearshore fishery contributes to the increasing 
fishing capacity. The right holders substitute their current fishing boats with larger and more 
efficient boats, resulting in an increased fishing effort (King, 2007). The increased size of the 
fishing vessels also corresponds with an increase in the power of the outboard motor of a 
fishing vessel as well. In the long run these larger vessels put pressure on the management due 
to their economic inefficiency to demand larger TACs. The WCRL nearshore fishery is a 
TAC-managed fishery, where fishers tend to overinvest in vessel improvements and in 
technology that may be the most efficient (Branch et al., 2006).  Use of the technological 
equipment such as Global Positioning System (GPS) and telecommunications by fishermen 
increase the effectiveness of the effort, where the GPS is used to set traps or nets in areas of 
high density more quickly. Fishermen communicate with each other to easily locate areas 
with high abundance of the fish stock (King, 2007). The WCRL nearshore fishery is managed 
with closed season, and the right holders will always race to fish as soon as possible before 
the closure of the season. The race for fish in this fishery leads to fishermen increasing the 
number of traps deployed in a single fishing trip.     
Also other fisheries in South Africa face the issue of overcapacity which needs immediate 
attention. The Canadian guideline principle “not increase (and preferably reduce) overall 
harvesting capacity” has been linked with the capacity issue in the South African fishing 
industry in study. 
In both fishing nations used as case, safety at sea it’s a priority, as in South Africa. The 
guideline principle “not compromise safety and be consistent with the policies and regulations 
of other agencies responsible for vessel safety”, has also in this study been linked with safety 
at sea issues.  Most South African fishing right holders change their boats with safety 
concerns in mind, since they were using smaller boats. Lastly the issue of economic viability 
of the fleet is also been linked in this study with one of the Canadian guideline principles 
which states “contribute to improved economic viability and not generate pressures for 
expanded allocations”. Most of the right holders change their fishing boats due to financial 
difficulties, such as rising fuel costs, broken boats and engines and increased operating costs.  
The South African fishing authority needs to put in a place more specific fishing replacement 
restrictions. The three fishing vessels replacement guidelines of the Canadian fisheries above 
have been linked with these issues so as to develop a base for developing South African 
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policy. The fishing vessel replacement restrictions should be a place as a measure of fishing 
capacity in the WCRL fishery. Due to the large number of fishing vessels in the fishery vessel 
scrapping can be combined with guidelines to decrease the number of vessels. As in the 
Northern Prawn Fishery in Australia, with the introduction of new vessels in the fishery a 
license holder has to give up the previous vessel license, and in that way capacity is reduced.  
In the fishing vessel replacement policy of Canada, two more replacement principles which 
state that “not result in any changes in allocations, fleet shares or access” and “encourage the 
adoption of self adjustment” have been linked with the capacity issue in WCRL fishery. This 
two principles focus on tackling the issue of right holders changing to larger and more 
efficient boats. The policy should be clear that upon changing a boat to a larger boat and 
expecting in the future to have a larger TAC is not possible, such that a right holder would 
have to adjust himself or herself by acquiring strategies to minimize operating costs and 
maximizing the resource rent from the fishery upon changing to a larger boat. The larger the 
fishing vessel the more costly it is for operations because of the increased horse power.  
The alternative system is the introduction of ITQs. The ITQs allow maximum flexibility of 
access rights, the right holders are allowed to harvest a particular amount of the TAC and can 
transfer this right by leasing or selling (Branch et al., 2006). In economic terms the ITQs 
enable right holders to catch more efficiently and improve the quality of the harvest to sell at 
best possible price. The ITQs also improve the safety at sea (BCMLE, 2006). The ITQs 
reduce overcapacity because they limit the competition within the fleets. The ITQs can solve 
economic and capacity issues.  
According to Branch et al. (2006) ITQs encourages the less efficient fishers to sell their 
quotas to more efficient owners and leave the fishery, and thus reducing overcapacity. But 
when new right holders sell their quotas this contradicts the current fisheries policy in South 
Africa regarding transformation. The transformation in South African fishing industry is the 
main objective of the policy. The large vessel owners can buy the quotas from the small 
owners’ enterprise, and they will often lose the ownership of quota and the access to the 
fishery. The Canadian replacement guidelines which states “Be consistent with the objectives 
of the current licensing policy” can be linked with these socio-political outcomes. In tackling 
this issue the transferability of the quotas should have restrictions such as temporary or 
permanent tradability, requirement of official approval of the transfer and as well as 
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maximum aggregation limits (BCLME, 2006). These restrictions could distort disadvantages 
of ITQs for socio-economic concerns.  
In Canada and Australia the vessel replacement guidelines were supplemented with the 
introduction of ITQs. If South Africa was to use these fishing vessel guidelines and ITQs it 
should be noted that the fisheries in these countries are very different from South African 
fisheries and that approaches in implementing the guidelines are also different. Hence, there 
are lessons to be learnt from these two cases but the recipe cannot be copied directly.     
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Annexure: Reasons given by the right holders when changing vessels 
Investments 
The right holder has bought a new vessel. 
The applicant has purchased his own vessel, which would be more viable to operate in the 
sector 
Applicant bought his own boat, wanted to catch his own quota and had verbal agreement of 
10% for entire catch and the agreement was broken when he was 20% when catch was 
completed. 
The current vessel has been sold, and the applicant bought his own vessel for the 2006/07 
season. 
The applicant has bought the 1% share of the replacement vessel, and the current vessel is 
smaller. 
The applicant purchased 33,3% of the shares in the vessel. 
The applicant have join a joint venture of three individuals, and bought a vessel Stranger, and 
yet the current vessel is in many fishing sectors like, linefish and abalone harvesting and did 
not have WCRL harvesting gear 
The applicant bought 1% share on the replacement vessel and it is bigger than the current 
vessel. 
The applicant’s father and uncle have bought the vessel Blue Chip he wants to move to it 
The applicant states that he bought himself a new vessel and would like utilize his own 
unnamed vessel 
The applicant will be a share holder with Mr Thompson in their company  
The nominated vessel has been sold and now the applicant has bought his vessel for the future 
fishing of his quota. 
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The vessel Brave Heart has got to many commitments, the applicant has 10 % shareholding 
on the replacement vessel Oceans 12. (the vessel is not currently on the WCRL and the The 
applicant have join a joint venture of three individuals, and bought a vessel Stranger, and yet 
the current vessel is in many fishing sectors like, linefish and abalone harvesting and did not 
have WCRL harvesting gear 
Engine breakdown and vessels under repairs 
The vessel Trust me has continuous engine breakdowns which resulted in their allocation not 
to be caught 
The nominated vessel broke down and now it is un-repairable  
The nominated vessel has continuous engine breakdowns which makes it difficult to catch 
their fish 
The nominated vessel has suffered structural damage when it fell off the trailer and will take 
time to be repaired  
The nominated vessel was in an accident, the boat was anchor in the harbor (Slip), during the 
night, the sea got rough and the boat got damaged  
The applicants boat engine is broke and is not in financial position for necessary repairs. 
The current vessel is irrepairable and not sea worthy, and was involved in accident 
The current vessel is irrepairable and not sea worthy, and was involved in accident 
The applicants vessel had some trouble with the buoyancy. 
The owner of the vessel Small Fry is scrapping the boat, as it is broken beyond repairs. The 
applicant is also willing to buy 10% shareholding on the vessel. 
The current vessel is unable to go to the sea, it is sea unworthy, and the vessel owner is not in 
the position to repair the vessel immediately. 
Safety 
The replacement vessel is bigger than the nominated vessel but substantially safer 
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The applicant had an accident at sea with the nominated vessel and now wants to change to 
the replacement vessel  
The applicant wants a bigger boat to catch his allocation 
The nominated vessel is small with 4m.while the replacement vessel is slightly bigger with 
5metres 
The nominated vessel is 5 meters in length and the applicant can no longer use the slipway as 
it has been repaired to sail from milers point, it is not safe for him to use smaller boat 
The old vessel does not have bouyancy certificate as required by SAMSA, the vessel is 
unsafe. 
The old vessel is traditional unsafe and the weather conditions in his region wouldn’t allow 
him to reach the fishing ground. And the applicant feels like he wont get all his allocation 
with the current vessel. 
The current vessel is unpractical and unsafe, and the fishing grounds are 30 -40 km away. 
The current vessel is too small to handle the bad weather they are experiencing in their area, 
and the applicant is in the process of buying 20% of the Shakes vessels. 
The previous vessel is too small and unsafe, there is no working space for the skipper, trawl 
man and the right holders and this vessel is going to utilized in the recreational purposes. 
Oversubscription 
The nominated vessel is over subscribed  
The nominated vessel Chimaera is over subscribed and she fears that her qouta will not be 
harvested  
The nominated vessel is not available to harvest her quota this season  
The applicant has not been satisfied with the vessel owner as the vessel owner has not made 
the vessel available 
The nomianted vessel has many Right Holders outstanding to catch their quotas. 
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The nominated vessel has no capacity to harvest the volume of all the boat nominees in one 
season; the owner is releasing some of its right holders. 
The current vessel Lady Alice does not have the capacity to harvest the volume of all the boat 
nominees in one season, so it releases some of its right holders. 
The Vessel Belinda does not have enough capacity to harvest all the volume for its nominees 
in one season, so it had to release some of the right holders. 
The owner of the nominated vessel (Sheron) will not be able to accommodate to fish WCRL 
that season 
The current vessel does not have enough capacity to harvest the volume of all the boat 
nominees fishing rights in one season. 
The applicant feels like the current vessel have some outstanding obligations before it harvest 
his quota, and will not be able to catch his quota as the season is nearly over. 
Financial problems 
Cannot afford to use own boat to haverst his lobster  
Cannot afford to maintain his boat, so rather he transfer his Rights to another boat  
The vessel has been sold due to financial difficulties  
The applicant cannot afford to go to sea with his own vessel, it costs him a lot 
The vessel owner released the applicant because of limited quota and the fuel costs would be 
very high while the catch will not be enough to cover the costs 
The vessel owner has refused to go to sea as the fuel costs are high. 
The nominated vessel is costing a lot of money for repairs and maintenance so it is expensive 
to maintain it 
The maintenance and to upkeep the boat is too expensive therefore had to sell the boat  
The nominated vessel was collected by the clerk of the court due to financial situation, the 
case was lost and vessel sold, so they need another vessel to catch  
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The current vessel was longer than 5.3 m and the applicant cannot afford the VMS and his 
two motors were stolen. 
Charter agreement breakdown 
The previous vessels owner and the applicant had disagreed on an agreement, and the 
applicant does want to continue with him. 
The vessel owner of the nominated vessel does not want quota holder to use the vessel 
anymore. 
The applicant is having problems with the skipper, who is unreliable and un-contactable. 
The applicant had problems with the current vessel by refusing to catch his quota on different 
harbor 
The applicant wishes to change because there was breakdown in the relationship between him 
and the original vessel owner 
Catch shortage 
The nominated vessel could not catch his 2007/2008 allocation and therefore want to change 
to replacement vessel  
Previous nominated vessel could not catch his 2007/2008 crayfish  
The nominated vessel had trouble catching their 2007/2008  
The nominated vessel has not landed one ton of their allocation since they got their permit 
Nominated vessel did catch the full allocation previously, so wants a more reliable vessel 
The nominated vessel only caught 150 kg's of the 750 kg's 2007/08 quota and the applicant 
feels that  it's unfair  
The nominated vessel did not harvest his allocation for previous 2 seasons, so the replacement 
vessel is better 
The nominated vessel has more than 1 right holders and the vessel could not catch all the 
crayfish for previous season, the replacement vessel will be able to catch  
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The Right Holders on Grace from start all lobster have not been caught, last season over a ton 
has been left in the sea, that is why they want to move to other vessel 
The nominated vessel has not been catching his allocation on time for the past 3 years and so 
would like to change to replacement vessel 
The applicants nominated vessel did not finish his quota for the season 2003 and 2004, and 
has bought his own boat. 
The applicants have not catch their whole quota and approached attorneys for their quota 
which was not caught reason being the company provided boats late in the season of 2003 and 
2004. 
The vessel owners never made any attempt to harvest applicants quota, the owners are in 
Cape Town and never sent the vessel to Gaansbaai for harvesting. 
Charter fee 
The nominated vessel gave him problems and now wants the replacement vessel to catch his 
lobster at a cheaper rate 
The replacement vessel charges less for a kg than the nominated vessel ,so this is 
economically viable for him 
The charging fee for the replacement vessel is R20.00 per kg than the previous vessel 
The applicant wants to increase his profit, and the charter fee on nominated vessel is too high. 
The current vessel has not made any attempts to harvest the allocation of the applicant during 
season 2005/07 which resulted in loss of income.. 
The current vessel charter fee is too high; the catching agreement has expired at the end of 
2005/06 allocation.  
The catch cost was becoming a big problem, plus the relationship between the owner and the 
applicant was at the point of not working together. 
The charter fee for the nominated vessel is too high therefore right holders as had no 
alternative but to source an alternative vessel. 
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The charter fee for the nominated vessel is too high therefore right holders as had no 
alternative  but to source an alternative vessel, the applicant is acting on behalf of Mr. Vuyani 
White. 
The owner of the vessel never made any effort to harvest applicant quota, besides the owner 
mentioned that its not worth it to go to Gansbaai to harvest for one persons quota. He also got 
abalone quota located to his vessel and wants to concentrate on the harvesting of abalone.   
The vessel owner has failed to harvest the cray fish; the applicant has entered a cheaper and 
more reliable catching agreement. 
Miscellaneous reasons 
The nominated vessel "Amber" was stolen  
Additional vessel assisting the nominated vessel to harvest their full allocation  
The owner of the nominated vessel advised the applicant that it would be best for her to utilise 
another vessel  
The owner of the nominated decided to withdraw the vessel Barrier Reef from the WCRL 
sector 
The Sophia is currently operational in the sector and meets all the applicants is looking for 
The client wants to change to a more reliable vessel owner that will catch his fish, had lots of 
problems with the nominated vessel owner 
The owner of the nominated vessel advised the applicant to utilize a second boat to catch his 
lobster 
The nominated vessel is not giving the applicant good service  
The applicant did not renew the catching agreement for the 2007/2008 season. 
The service that the applicant is getting from the owner of the nominated vessel is very bad 
and she wish to transfer her right to the replacement vessel 
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The reason for an additional vessel is low catch rates for WCRL, currently experienced by 
vessels fishing WCRL  in both area 7 and 8 and consolidation catch effort 
The applicant has no contact with the nominated vessel 
The applicant did not have a vessel of himself and had to use the nominated vessel during the 
2001-2002 season to undertake limited commercial fishing of WCRL 
The nominated vessel cannot guarantee to fulfill his obligations as he is  struggling to catch 
his own quota. 
The current vessel is active on the line fish sector. 
The vessel owner has long been sick with (degenerate spondylosis with L-5 spondylolithesis), 
the doctor advised him not to go the sea. 
The current vessel is active in the line-sector fishery, the Greystone vessel is an economical 
viable.  
The applicant is scared that the previous boat owner is not complying with the permit 
conditions, and afraid that he might lose his quota with such behavior. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
